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GUILTY BY A NOSE: THE QUEEN V. 
RIESBERRY AND THE CRIMINALIZATION 
OF RACEHORSE DOPING IN CANADA 
BRIAN MANARIN* AND REEM ZAIA** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To use an often embraced horse racing term, the trial result in the  
prosecution of The Queen v. Derek Riesberry,1 on allegations of doping and 
attempting to dope horses that he trained for Standardbred competitions, could 
best be described as an “upset.”2  Although the Crown never wins or loses a 
case,3 at least on a philosophical level, the findings of fact in Riesberry would 
appear to have foreclosed any notion of an acquittal.  Yet, the trial judge felt 
obliged to dismiss the charges at the conclusion of the first-ever case of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* B.A., LL.B. (Windsor), LL.M. (London), Ph.D. candidate (Leicester), Assistant Crown  
Attorney, Windsor, Ontario, Canada. 
** B.Soc., J.D. (Ottawa), LL.M. (University of Toronto), Associate Lawyer at Henein Hutchison 
LLP, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.  The views expressed herein are those of the authors in their personal 
capacity only. 
1. Queen v. Riesberry: R. v. Riesberry [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1167 (Can.). 
2. Although a disputed bit of lore, it is believed by some that the term upset took on special  
significance in the annals of horse racing when a horse named “Upset” defeated the heavily favoured 
“Man o’ War” in 1919, at Saratoga racetrack.  See Sports Legend Revealed: Did the Term ‘Upset’ in 
Sports Derive From a Horse Named Upset Defeating Man o’ War?, Sports Now, L.A. TIMES (May 
10, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/sports_blog/2011/05/sports-legend-revealed-did-the-term-
upset-in-sports-derive-from-a-horse-named-upset-defeating-man-o-.html. 
3. See Boucher v. The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16, 23–24 (Can.), where Mr. Justice Rand made the 
following comment: 
 
It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a 
conviction, it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence  
relevant to what is alleged to be a crime.  Counsel have a duty to see that all available  
legal proof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate 
strength but it must also be done fairly.  The role of the prosecutor excludes any notion of 
winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can 
be none charged with greater personal responsibility.  It is to be efficiently performed with 
an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings.  
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racehorse doping prosecuted in a Canadian criminal court4 (as opposed to  
before a regulatory body).  A little over five years after the original police  
investigation concluded, the Supreme Court of Canada released its  
ground-breaking decision reversing the trial court’s verdict and, on some 
counts, substituting convictions.5 In doing so, the unanimous Court succinctly 
explained the concept of what constitutes committing a fraud on the betting 
public.  
This article proceeds in four parts, detailing: (1) the Riesberry case as it 
made its way from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to the Court of  
Appeal for Ontario and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court of Canada; (2) the 
Ontario Racing Commission (“ORC”), the regulatory body that typically  
oversees the conduct of Standardbred racing in the province of Ontario, and 
why prosecution options were not simply left to that tribunal in the case in 
question; (3) the use of secondary aides, including comparative law  
approaches, to assist in resolving cases of novel domestic concern; and (4) the 
particular ethical issues that historically pervade sporting events where  
animals and performance-enhancing (“PE”) drugs coincide. 
II. PART I: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUEEN V. 
RIESBERRY  
In the trial before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the accused faced 
a six-count indictment which alleged that on or about the 28th day of  
September, 2010, he did, (1) by deceit, falsehood, or other fraudulent means, 
defraud the public of money of a value exceeding $5,000.00 to wit: money 
wagered on the outcome of a horse race; (2) with the intent to defraud  
members of the public, engage in the wagering of money on the outcome of a 
horse race, cheat while playing a game, by hypodermically administering a 
substance to a horse entered in a race; and (3) knowingly commit the offence 
of administering a drug to a horse that is entered in a race in such a manner 
that a certificate of positive analysis would be issued under section 165 of the 
Pari-Mutuel Betting Supervision Regulations (“PMBSR”).6  Counts four, five, 
and six involved attempt to commit the same offences as were reflected in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4. See Sarah Sacheli, Trainer Found Guilty in Court for Horse Doping, HARNESS LINK (Oct. 30, 
2014), http://www.harnesslink.com/News/Trainer-found-guilty-in-court-for-horse-doping. 
5. R. v. Riesberry, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1167, para. 29–32 (Can.). 
6. See Indictment, R. v. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504 (Can. Ont.) ( CR-11-2450) (listing counts 
one, two, and three against Riesberry as offence of fraud exceeding $5,000.00, Criminal Code, R.S.C. 
1985, c. C-46, sec. 380(1) (Can.), offence of cheating at play, Criminal Code, sec. 209, and offence of 
violating the PMBSR, Criminal Code, sec. 204(10)). 
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counts one, two, and three of the indictment, save for the assertion that the  
attempts occurred at a later date.7  As the trial progressed, it became clear that 
the prosecution would not be able to prove that a certificate of positive  
analysis would necessarily flow from the actus reus (the injection and  
attempted injection scenarios).  As such, the Crown invited acquittals on those 
two counts.8  Thus, the only live considerations for the trial judge were the 
fraud and cheat at play allegations.  For purposes of this article, the relevant 
evidentiary foundation of the case can be summarized as follows: 
 
The accused, Derek Riesberry, was a licensed Standardbred 
horse trainer.  On September 28, 2010, he was captured on 
video injecting something into the trachea of a race horse 
named “Everyone’s Fantasy" at the Windsor Raceway at  
approximately 7:37 p.m.  About an hour later, Everyone’s 
Fantasy ran in race six of the program and finished in sixth 
place; 
 
The video recording of the accused came by way of a  
judicially authorized covert surveillance camera that was 
placed in a horse stall at the Windsor Raceway;  
 
On November 7, 2010, the accused was arrested as he arrived 
at the Windsor Raceway while transporting a horse named 
“Good Long Life.”  The horse was scheduled to race that 
evening.  A search of the accused’s truck revealed two  
syringes each containing fluid.  One syringe contained a  
combination of the drugs Epinephrine and Clenbuterol, and 
the other syringe contained the drug Clotol; 
 
Epinephrine is a powerful stimulant, which also occurs  
naturally as part of the body’s adrenal system.  Clenbuterol is 
a bronchodilator. There is no therapeutic reason that  
Epinephrine and Clenbuterol should be given to a horse that is 
not in distress.  The horse “Good Long Life” was not in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7. See Indictment, Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504 (counts four, five, and six alleged attempts on 
November 7, 2010). 
8. See Appellants Factum (re Fraud), R. v. Riesberry, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1167, at para. 5 (No. 
36179). 
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distress as it appeared on the video.  Additionally, there are no 
veterinary medicines that should be given by intratracheal  
injection to a horse; 
 
The PMBSR prohibit the presence of Epinephrine and  
Clenbuterol in racehorses at the time of racing.  Clotol was 
not a prohibited drug at the time of racing; however, within 
raceway grounds, it could only be given to a horse by a  
licensed veterinarian; 
 
Bets totaling $12,746.40 were placed by members of the pub-
lic on race six on September 28, 2010 when “Everyone’s  
Fantasy” was entered to race, and the total payout was 
$9,480.20 for that race.  Bets totaling $11,758.60 were placed 
by members of the public on race three on November 7, 2010, 
when “Good Long Life” was entered to race, and the total 
payout for that race was $8,691.17; 
 
Mr. Riesberry did not testify at trial; 
 
In addition to the federal PMBSR drug presence structures, 
the Ontario Rules of Standardbred Racing (“Rules”) go  
further and prohibit licensees, other than official veterinarians, 
from possessing any syringe while racetrack grounds.  This is 
to prevent the unauthorized drugging of horses.  The trial 
judge found that the accused was a licensed horse trainer who 
was bound by the Rules and thus, was prohibited from  
possessing syringes at the Windsor Raceway; 
 
Horse racing and wagering thereupon are subject to an  
extensive regulatory scheme enabled by the Criminal Code 
(“Code”) and complementary provincial legislation.   
Wagering on a horse race outside the regulated framework is a 
criminal offence.  Breach of the regulations for horse racing 
constitutes a criminal offence.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9. Id. at para. 10–15; see also Respondent’s Factum (re Fraud), Riesberry, [2015], at para. 6–12, 
(No. 36179).   
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On the backdrop of the foregoing evidence, the trial judge 
made the following penultimate findings that were dispositive 
of the factual guilt of the accused: 
 
Clenbuterol and Epinephrine are also on a list of  
prohibited drugs as they can be performance-enhancing 
depending on when they are administered.  They are  
prohibited if used to enhance the performance of a horse 
on race day; 
 
Clenbuterol is a bronchodilator.  It opens up the small 
bronchi in the horse’s lungs so that more oxygen gets into 
the blood more quickly and the whole system of the horse 
functions more efficiently.  It therefore would have been, 
at the time, a performance enhancing drug; 
 
Epinephrine is a powerful stimulant.  Tracheal injections 
cause the Epinephrine to pool and not be absorbed  
quickly.  Once the horse exercises in the warm-up or the 
race starts, the “Fight or Flight” syndrome engages.  Once 
that engagement starts, the Epinephrine enters the  
bloodstream quickly.  It enhances the horse’s performance 
but dissipates before testing can occur; 
 
Mr. Riesberry acted deceitfully in that he brought loaded 
syringes to the racetrack on September 28, 2010, and  
attempted to bring loaded syringes on November 7, 2010, 
onto racetrack property in contravention of the Rules; 
 
What Mr. Riesberry injected into the horse “Everyone’s 
Fantasy” on September 28, 2010, was either Epinephrine, 
Clenbuterol, or a combination thereof, for  
performance-enhancing purposes and not for any  
therapeutic purpose; 
 
The possession of the syringe loaded with Epinephrine 
and Clenbuterol on November 7, 2010, was in anticipation 
of a performance-enhancing injection into the horse 
“Good Long Life” that was to race that evening; 
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On both dates, the accused attempted to create an unfair 
advantage for the horses he had entered.  These acts  
resulted in cheating.10 
 
Despite Mr. Riesberry’s obvious resort to deceit, falsehood, or other 
fraudulent means,11 the trial court interpreted the laws of fraud and cheating at 
play so narrowly, as to find a reasonable doubt on whether its pith and  
substance engaged.  Regarding fraud simpliciter, section 380(1) of the Code12 
explains that everyone will be guilty of fraud “who by deceit, falsehood or 
other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the  
meaning of the Act, defrauds the public or any person, whether ascertained or 
not, of any property, money, or valuable security or any service.”13  Similarly, 
cheating at play is referenced in section 209 of the Code,14 which states  
“everyone who, with intent to defraud any person cheats while playing a game 
or in holding the stakes for a game or in betting is guilty of an indictable  
offence.”15 However, the added dimension to a criminal cheating at play  
allegation is that the cheating must be born of a “game.”  Section 197 of the 
Code16 further explains that a game “means a game of chance or mixed chance 
and skill.”17  As such, the court must make a further finding.  Games that  
involve pure skill are thus not contemplated under the more discerning  
cheating at play analysis.  Furthermore, while cheating at play may indeed fall 
under the general umbrella that covers fraudulent conduct, the converse need 
not necessarily hold true given the particularized definition of what a game  
entails. 
The reasonable doubt that lingered with the trial judge on the allegations 
of fraud and attempted fraud exceeding $5,000.00 can be traced to four, albeit 
erroneous, concerns that inured to the benefit of the beguiling horse trainer: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10. R. v. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504, para. 39 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
11. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 380(1) (Can.) [hereinafter Criminal Code].  Note 
that there is no exhaustive definition of fraud to be found in the Code, nor could there be as the 
bounds of dishonest deprivation are arguably limitless. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at § 209 (“Every one who, with intent to defraud any person, cheats while playing a game 
or in holding the stakes for a game or in betting is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to  
imprisonment for term not exceeding two years.”).  
15. Id. 
16. Id. at § 197. 
17. Id. 
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1. There was no evidence as to the amount that was bet on either 
race, or if there was, the amount did not exceed $5,000.00; 
2. The Crown failed to prove deprivation perpetrated on the betting 
public or, assuming there had been a deprivation, such alleged 
deprivation was too remote;  
3. The betting public did not participate in the race, it only wagered 
on the outcome of it; 
4. A race is not a game in accordance with the definition in section 
197 of the Code, as there is no element of chance in the horse race 
itself.18 
 
The first issue was based on a finding of no evidence or, in the alternative, 
that the evidence of the quantum of the deprivation, or risk of deprivation, did 
not exceed the amounts alleged in the relevant counts (i.e. $5,000.00).  It was 
not so much a finding of insufficiency as it was a finding of non-existence.  
The accuracy of the finding could very well constitute an error in law if it  
indicated a failure of the court to consider the whole of the trial evidence.19  
What made the trial court’s judgment immediately suspect was the quantum 
issue, since it had been dealt with by way of an admission at the end of the 
case for the prosecution.20  Those admissions should have rendered the  
quantum issue a foregone conclusion for the court, which also explains why 
neither counsel made any closing submissions on the point.21  As will be  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18. R. v. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504 at para. 30–36. 
19. See R. v. Morin, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 268 (Can.) (the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized  
 
 [a] trial judge must consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue but unless 
the reasons demonstrate that this was not done, the failure to record the fact of it having 
been done is not a proper basis for concluding that there was an error of law in this  
respect).  
 
Id. at 296. 
20. Trial Transcript, R. v. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504, para 108–109 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) 
(Nov. 23, 2012) (where the defence admitted evidence of Gordon Murray explaining the race earnings 
for the races in question by allowing trial exhibit 22A, a transcript of his preliminary inquiry  
testimony.  Additionally, the corresponding printouts of the race earnings in question, that were  
referred to in the preliminary inquiry testimony of Gordon Murray, were made exhibit 22B at the  
trial.).  
21. See Trial Transcript, R. v. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (May 22, 
2013). 
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discussed in more detail in Part III of this article, in circumstances where 
counsel have overlooked an issue that remains live in the mind of the court, it 
is submitted that procedural fairness dictates that the court should seek out the 
input of the litigants.  
The trial court’s concerns regarding issues two and three turned on the 
concepts of deprivation and remoteness.  Given that the Crown particularized22 
the indictment to allege that the betting public was the victim extant, it was 
therefore incumbent on the prosecution to establish a risk of deprivation  
resulting from the conduct of the accused.  Clearly, the court was of the  
opinion that the betting public was too amorphous a group for consideration 
when it opined that “if anyone was deprived or at risk of deprivation by Mr. 
Riesberry’s conduct, it was the other participants in the race, not the betting 
public.”23  Indeed, the court observed that “there has been no evidence  
advanced that any member of the betting public placed a bet because they  
either knew or did not know” of the impugned conduct.24  Thus, it would  
appear that in being unable to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the betting 
public was at risk of deprivation by the accused’s actions, the trial judge was 
arguably saying that the Crown’s case lacked the necessary connective tissue 
to support the anatomy of a fraud.  Essentially, the court assumed that a  
deceit-driven indictment, underpinned by proof of a personal nexus between 
fraudster and victim, was necessary.  And even if a deprivation had been  
established, the court relied on R. v. Vezina25 to support a fallback position that 
such an alleged deprivation would be too remote.  Remoteness is inextricably 
tied to the concept of foreseeability.  Thus, the trial judge had found that the 
betting public was so far removed from the actions of the horse trainer as to be 
beyond the realm of objective contemplation.   
Finally, and perhaps most remarkably, the trial court found as a matter of 
law that horse racing is a game of pure skill without any element of chance.26  
The prosecution’s submissions on cheating at play included, inter alia, the  
following comments about what constitutes chance: “What pole position does 
the horse get?  That’s a matter of you know, picking names out of a hat.  So if 
you have the inside pole as opposed to the outside pole you’ve got a better  
position.”27  Although not conceded by the defence at trial, counsel stated “I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22. See R. v. Elliot, [1976] 4 W.W.R. 285 (Can. B.C. C.A.). 
23. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504 at para. 22. 
24. Id. at para. 20. 
25. See R. v. Vezina, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 2 (Can. Q.A.C.). 
26. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504 at para. 30. 
27. Trial Transcript Final Submissions, R. v. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504, para. 22, line 11 
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don’t take challenge with my friend’s submissions on cheating, the ingredients 
of cheating.”28 
 Despite the foregoing, when the court rendered its final judgment on  
August 15, 2013, approximately three months after hearing the submissions of 
counsel, it ruled that a horse race was a game of pure skill.  That decision was 
based on the 1843 American decision of Harless v. United States,29 emanating 
from the Supreme Court of Iowa.  Even though the Harless decision was never 
put to either counsel for their comments, it made its way into the final  
judgment and was dispositively cited as “an accurate reflection of the law as 
set out in the definition sections of game in section 147 [sic] of the Criminal 
Code [of Canada.]”30  The following passage from Harless was incorporated 
into the trial judge’s decision: 
 
Penal statutes must not be construed to embrace cases not 
clearly within their provisions.  The word “game” does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (May 22, 2013) (hereinafter Final Submissions).  It is also important to note 
that the following evidence, legislation, and rules were before the trial judge.  Respondent’s Factum 
(re cheating at play), Riesberry, at para. 7–9 (No. 36179) (Aug. 5, 2015):  
 
7. Standardbred horseracing has elements of both skill and chance. Uncontested evidence 
at trial showed that a systemic element of chance consists in the determination of the 
horse’s starting position, called the post position (“position de depart”).  Post positions are 
determined by a “random post position generator” or the Standardbred Canada computer 
system.  The computer draws at random from among the horses entered in a given race to 
determine which horse starts in which post position.  The more advantageous post  
positions are those closer to the inside rail of the track, since those post positions offer the 
shortest traveling distance around the track …  
 
8.  The random determination of post positions is legally mandated by the Rules of  
Standardbred Racing 2008 [The Rules] a regulation made by the Ontario Racing  
Commission under the authority of the Racing Commission Act, 2000.  The Rules,  
specifically rules 17.09 and 17.10, require that entrants’ post positions must be “drawn by 
lot” from among the entered and eligible horses that are selected to start the race.  
 
9.  Federal regulations require that after post positions are drawn, that information must be 
made available to the public, before bettors place their bets on a race . . . 
 
28. Final Submissions, supra note 27, at para. 98, line 25. 
29. Harless v. United States, 1 Morris 169 (Iowa 1843). 
30. R. v. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504, para. 32 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).  It is important to note 
that the Code at section 197 (which defines what constitutes a game) and section 209 (which prohibits 
cheating while playing a game), were enacted in 1985, over a century after Harless was announced. 
See infra note 153. 
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embrace all uncertain events, nor does the expression “games 
of chance” embrace all games.  As generally understood, 
games are of two kinds, games of chance and games of skill.  
Besides, there are trials of strength, trials of speed and various 
other uncertainties which are perhaps no games at all,  
certainly they are not games of chance.  Among this class may 
be ranked a horserace.  It is as much a game for two persons 
to strive which can raise the heaviest weight, or live the  
longest under water, as it is to test the speed of two horses.31 
 
Despite the Code including the criteria of “chance or mixed chance and 
skill”32 as the factual underpinning to find the existence of a “game,” the trial 
court opted for a dated ex juris precedent to determine the issue.  Thus, the 
parties were deprived of a conclusion not only based on the evidence, but also 
on the statutory regulatory scheme.  An appeal was therefore all but inevitable. 
A. The Court of Appeal for Ontario   
On October 28, 2014, the Court of Appeal for Ontario released its  
judgment and allowed the Crown’s appeal of the acquittals entered at trial  
involving fraud and cheating at play.  In doing so, it quickly accepted what 
had been undisputed at trial and on appeal; “that evidence was led at trial  
indicating that bets in excess of $5,000.00 were placed on both races.”33  The 
trial judge’s statement to the contrary constituted an error of law given that it 
was clearly indicative “that he failed to consider the whole of the evidence.”34 
Of more significance were the court’s observations that pertained to the 
risk of deprivation.  Regarding what the betting public is entitled to assume 
about the sport of kings, the following was said: 
 
[I]t was established at trial that horse racing is a highly  
regulated industry and that the regulatory scheme includes a 
ban on the presence of the performance enhancing drugs  
utilized by the respondent in the body of a horse on race day.  
Given the regulatory scheme, bettors were entitled to bet on 
each race assuming that no horse in the race was affected by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504, at para. 31; Harless, at 172–73. 
32. Criminal Code, at § 197. 
33. R. v. Riesberry, [2014] O.J. No. 5094, para. 18 (Can. Ont. C.A.) 
34. Id. 
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such drugs.35 
 
In discussing deprivation, the regulatory body, and those licenced to  
participate in the regulated horse racing activities, the implications of the 
court’s comments seem to suggest that the public as bettors drive the  
regulatory agenda: 
 
[W]here there is a failure to disclose material non-compliance 
with the regulatory scheme, it is no answer to say bettors may 
have relied on other factors in making their bets.  Bettors were  
entitled to assume compliance with the regulatory scheme 
when weighing those other factors and coming to a final  
decision.  Non-compliance with the regulatory scheme in a 
manner so as to affect the outcome of the race necessarily puts 
the bettors’ economic interests at risk.  Bettors are deprived of 
information about the race that they were entitled to know; 
they were also deprived of an honest race run in accordance 
with the rules.36 
 
. . .  
The Court of Appeal was adamant that on the facts, “bettors had their bets 
at risk.”37  Thus, any suggestion of remoteness was dismissed as misguided.38  
Indeed, it is difficult to see how a remoteness analysis could gain any traction 
given the exalted position that the betting public assumes overall in the sport.  
The cheating at play charges were summarily reviewed by the court,  
perhaps because some of the comments that they made about the fraud charges 
had equal application to the concept of cheating.  However, as was alluded to 
earlier in this article, the significant additional component to a cheating at play 
allegation is that there must be evidence that the swindling behaviour occurred 
while playing a game, that is, one that involves chance or mixed chance and 
skill.  Games of pure skill are exempt from impugnation, at least under the 
section in question.  The error of law was concisely stated in a single sentence: 
“In relying on an American decision that did not contemplate the possibility of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35. Id. at para. 20. 
36. Id. at para. 22. 
37. Id. at para. 23. 
38. Id. 
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a game of mixed chance and skill to support his conclusion that horseracing is 
a game of pure skill, the trial judge erred in law.”39  Regarding any issue of 
remoteness, the court further pointed to the fact that section 209 of the Code 
speaks of defrauding “any person”40 when cheating at play and, as such, “any 
person would clearly encompass any person betting on a race and not just 
those participating in a race.”41  
 
Under section 686(4)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Code: 
 
(4) If an appeal is from an acquittal or verdict that the  
appellant or respondent was unfit to stand trial or not 
criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, the 
court of appeal may 
 
(b) allow the appeal, set aside the verdict and  
 
 (i) order a new trial, or 
 
(ii) except where the verdict is that of a court 
composed of a judge and jury, enter a verdict of 
guilty with respect to the offence of which, in its 
opinion, the accused should have been found 
guilty but for the error in law, and pass a sentence 
that is warranted in law, or remit the matter to the 
trial court and direct the trial court to impose a 
sentence that is warranted in law.42 
 
In Riesberry, the Crown requested that the Court of Appeal “enter guilty 
verdicts on all charges, or, in the alternative, order a new trial.”43  In response 
to the requested remedies, the appellate court emphasized the differing tests 
that must be engaged.  To order a new trial, “the Crown must demonstrate that 
the trial judge committed an error, and that the outcome of the trial might  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39. Id. at para. 31. 
40. Criminal Code, at § 380(1). 
41. Riesberry, [2014] O.J. No. 5094, at para. 32. 
42. Criminal Code, at § 686(4)(b)(i)–(ii). 
43. Riesberry,  [2014] O.J. No. 5094 at para. 32. 
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reasonably have been different if the error of law had not occurred.”44   
However, in order for a guilty verdict to be substituted, the Crown must  
further prove that “the accused should have been found guilty but for the error 
in law.”45  Such a substitution is possible only where all necessary findings of 
fact have been made by the trial court for each element of the offence, “either 
implicitly or explicitly, or if the facts are not in issue.”46  The Court of Appeal 
had no problem substituting guilty verdicts for the fraud and attempted fraud 
charges, and remitting the matter back to the trial judge for a sentencing  
hearing.  However, new trials were ordered on the cheat at play and attempt 
cheat at play allegations.  Although the court recognized the existence of the 
Ontario Rules of Standardbred Racing which “require that starting post  
positions be drawn by lot from among the entered horses that are eligible and 
selected to start: rule 17.09 and 17.10,”47 and that the evidence at trial “show[] 
that post position is determined by a computerized random post position  
generator and that certain post positions are more advantageous than others in 
that the advantageous positions provide shorter distances to travel,”48 an actual 
finding at trial that this evidence imbued a horse race with an element of 
chance was missing from the trial record.  That particular Rubicon had not 
been crossed as the trial judge had “made no reference to this evidence.”49  In 
order for a game to be one of mixed chance and skill, there must be a  
“systemic resort to chance, to determine outcomes, and not merely the  
unpredictables that may occasionally defeat skill.”50  Given that drawing lots 
for post position is a predictable procedure that precedes all Standardbred 
horse races in Ontario and is thus not subject to the vicissitudes that may  
impact other aspects of horse racing, it is attractive to submit that a finding of 
mixed chance and skill must be a fait accompli.  Any other finding would  
torture not only reality, but also faith in judicial sagacity.  Nevertheless, the 
Court of Appeal remained steadfast that the decision was the province of the 
trier of fact ab initio.  
Although not argued at trial, an additional use of the evidence was  
articulated before the Court of Appeal as follows: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44. Id. at para. 36 (citing R. v. Graveline, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 609, para. 14–16 (Can.)). 
45. Id. at para. 37 (citing R. v. Cassidy, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 345, 354 (Can.). 
46. Id.  
47. Id. at para. 41. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at para. 42. 
50. Id. at para. 40 (citing Ross, Banks, & Dyson v. R., [1968] S.C.R. 786 (Can.). 
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[T]he Crown argued that even if horse racing was a game of 
pure skill, the appellant’s deceitful conduct in this case  
transformed the horse-races at issue into games of mixed 
chance and skill.  For this argument the Crown relied on the 
Supreme Court’s judgment in R v McGarey, [1974] SCR 278.  
There, the accused had secretly weighted some of the bottles 
in a game of bottle toss.  The Supreme Court found that this 
type of cheating transformed the nature of the game in  
question from one of pure skill to one of mixed chance and 
skill.51 
 
Similarly, on this submission the court recognized that “[w]hether a  
particular form of cheating transforms a game of pure skill into a game of 
mixed chance and skill is a highly factual inquiry for which the requisite  
factual findings have not been made.”52  
B. The Supreme Court of Canada 
An appeal as of right awaited Riesberry on his fraud and attempted fraud 
guilty verdicts that were substituted by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.   
Under section 691(2)(b) of the Code: 
 
(2) A person who is acquitted of an indictable offence other 
than by reason of a verdict of not criminally responsible on 
account of mental disorder and whose acquittal is set aside by 
the court of appeal may appeal to the Supreme Court of  
Canada. 
 
(b) on any question of law, if the Court of Appeal enters a 
verdict of guilty against the person.53 
 
Additionally, leave to appeal was granted so that a challenge could be 
made on the questions of law that pertained to the new trials that were ordered 
on the cheating at play and attempted cheating at play counts.54  Ultimately, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51. Id. at para. 44. 
52. Id. at para. 45. 
53. Criminal Code, at § 691(2)(b). 
54. Id. at § 691(2)(c) (which allows for an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada “on any  
question of law if leave to appeal is granted by the Supreme Court of Canada”). 
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the Supreme Court of Canada rendered bench dismissals of the appeals on  
October 13, 2015,55 with written reasons delivered on December 18, 2015.56  
Starting with the cheating at play convictions, Justice Cromwell, writing 
for a unanimous seven-member panel, embarked upon a rather cursory  
examination of the appellant’s arguments.  Like the Court of Appeal for  
Ontario, he fixed his sights on the trial court’s use of American jurisprudence 
in the circumstances as well as its failure to consider the evidence that was  
introduced by the Crown in support of its mixed chance and skill argument.  
Regarding the reliance on the Harless decision, Justice Cromwell, had this to 
say: 
 
It is somewhat unclear to what extent the trial judge relied on 
this authority as stating the law in Canada.  However, to the 
extent that he did so, he made a legal error.  The statute  
considered by the US court divided games into two categories, 
games of chance and games of skill.  That case, therefore, did 
not address a point that must be addressed under the Criminal 
Code.  That point is whether horse racing is a game of mixed 
chance and skill.57 
 
As to the body of evidence regarding chance in horse racing that was  
patent on the trial record, the court demurely observed: 
 
Even if we were to accept that the trial judge was alive to this 
difference between the law as set out in Harless and Canadian 
law, he nonetheless erred by failing to consider evidence in 
the record upon which a trier of fact could find that there was 
systematic resort to chance which made the race a game of 
mixed chance and skill.  I therefore conclude that the trial 
judge erred in law on this aspect of the case.58 
 
With respect to the allegations relating to fraud, it would appear that the 
court’s primary concern focused on whether the acts of the accused resulted in 
a risk of deprivation that was not too remote from the PE conduct in question.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55. Riesberry, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1167. 
56. Id. para. 29–32. 
57. Id. at para. 11. 
58. Id. at para. 12. 
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The question as fashioned by the appellant was whether the Crown had  
established “that anyone betting on the race had been induced to bet by, or 
would not have bet but for, his fraudulent conduct.”59  However, Justice 
Cromwell was quick to point out that “proof of fraud does not always depend 
on showing that the alleged victim relied on the fraudulent conduct or was  
induced by it to act to his or her detriment.”60  
Therefore, “what is required in all cases is proof that there is a sufficient 
causal connection between the fraudulent act and the victim’s risk of  
deprivation.”61  While establishing inducement and reliance scenarios on the 
evidence may typically involve more orthodox examples of deceit and  
falsehood, it must be remembered that:  
 
Fraudulent conduct for the purposes of a fraud prosecution is 
not limited to deception, such as deception by  
misrepresentations of fact.  Rather, fraud requires proof of 
“deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means”: s. 380(1).  The 
term “other fraudulent means encompasses all other means 
that can properly be stigmatized as dishonest”: R v Olan, 
[1978] 2 SCR 1175 at p 1180.62 
 
It is respectfully submitted that a fundamental error at trial involved the 
court’s preoccupation with the fact that “there has been no evidence advanced 
that any member of the betting public placed a bet because they either knew or 
did not know of the injection of “Everyone’s Fantasy” on September 28, 2010 
before the race.”63  Although superficially attractive, the idea that inducement 
necessarily produces a resultant deprivation is legally superfluous.  Indeed, it 
is beyond argument that the best acts of subterfuge are those that go unnoticed.  
Most importantly for the development of racehorse doping jurisprudence in 
Canada, the Supreme Court sent the following message about such forms of 
conduct: 
 
There is a direct causal relationship between Mr. Riesberry’s 
dishonest acts and the risk of financial deprivation to the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59. Id. at para. 21. 
60. Id. at para. 22. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at para. 23. 
63. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504, at para. 9–10. 
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betting public.  Simply put, a rigged race creates a risk of 
prejudice to the economic interests of bettors.  Provided that a 
causal link exists, the absence of inducement or reliance is  
irrelevant.64 
 
III. PART II: THE REGULATORY SCHEME  
A. The Important Benefits of Regulation  
Until the horse trainer Derek Riesberry was brought before the criminal 
courts, arguably as a “test case,”65 Canadian authorities were content to leave 
the regulation and discipline of licensees to the various Racing Commissions 
around the country.66  The reasons for maintaining the status quo were at least 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64. Riesberry, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1167, at para. 26. 
65. See ALLAN MANSON, THE LAW OF SENTENCING 145 (2000) (where the author explains that  
 
Legislative provisions which have novel or ambiguous dimensions can generate good 
faith attempts to test their scope. With respect to non-violent crimes, an effort to create a 
test case for adjudicative purposes can result in a mitigated sentence. Of course, just being 
one of the first individuals prosecuted is not the same as an offence which was the product 
of a will to test the legislation. However, given the costs, rigours and uncertainties of  
protracted litigation, there can be a mitigating effect for an accused who tries to carry a 
case forward even if this decision arose after the charge. 
 
Despite the foregoing, affording a criminal prosecution “test case” status is not simply a 
matter of proclamation by counsel, although a joint submission in this regard would be 
helpful. Suffice it to say that a test case, whether it be criminal or civil in nature, requires a 
judicial determination of the issue. See generally: R. v. Stewart (No. 2) (1983), 45 O.R. 
(2d) 185 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.); R. v. Blair, [1993] O.J. No. 1950 (Can. Ont. Pr. Div.); R. v. 
Spindloe, [1998] S.J. No. 856 (Can. S.K. Pr. Ct.); R. v. M.A.F.A. Inc., [2000] O.J. No. 
1773 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.); and, Price v. Panasonic Canada Inc., [2002] O.J. No. 5437 (Can. 
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)). 
 
66. RICHARD BROWN & MURRAY RANKIN, PERSUASION, PENALTIES AND PROSECUTION: 
ADMINISTRATIVE V. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN SECURING COMPLIANCE: SEVEN CASE STUDIES 342 
(M.L. Friedland ed., 1990) (Considering a possible explanation for this phenomenon:  
 
Legal actors may be reluctant to stigmatize most regulatory offenders with criminal  
penalties because their offences are perceived to be morally ambiguous.  This ambiguity 
distinguishes regulatory offences from conventional crimes that violate a well-established 
moral code.  As already noted, many infractions cause no actual damage, and the absence 
of any injury may make the offender appear less blameworthy … The stigma associated 
with the criminal process may be seen as an unnecessary irritant in many cases and,  
therefore, as a reason for not prosecuting.). 
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threefold: (1) a readily available body of recognized expertise within the  
oversight tribunal; (2) relaxed evidentiary thresholds and a lesser overall 
standard of proof required to hold wrongdoers accountable; and (3) a  
voluntary compliance scheme whereby the granting of a licence afforded  
benefits, but also imposed obligations, on the licensees. 
1. Expertise 
Whereas courts, with a few exceptions, are generalist in nature, tribunals 
are much more focused and specialized seats of administrative justice.  The 
recognition of regulatory body expertise often can be gleaned from a perusal 
of the legislation that typically drives its decisions.67  Indeed, the interpretation 
and application of “home statutes,”68 day in and day out, suggests a working 
knowledge that far exceeds the occasional user of the legislation in question.  
Upon judicial review of administrative action, regardless of what  
reviewing standard has been used over the years,69 the need for deference to 
the particular knowledge of the body being reviewed is consistently  
recognized, although “expertise must be understood as a relative, not an  
absolute concept.”70  Thus, as between a tribunal and a reviewing court, should 
there be a lack of relative expertise on the part of the tribunal, deference may 
be legitimately refused.71  As explained by Justice Bastarache for the majority 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of  
Citizenship and Immigration):72  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
67. As explained by Chief Justice McLachlin in Dr. Q v. College of Physicians & Surgeons of 
British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, para. 29 (Can.): 
 
[A] statute may call for decision-makers to have expert qualifications, to have  
accumulated experience in a particular area, or to play a particular role in policy  
development . . . .  Similarly, an administrative body might be so habitually called upon to 
make findings of fact in a distinct legislative context that it can be said to have gained a 
measure of relative institutional expertise. 
 
68. See ATCO Power Ltd., v. Alberta Utilities Comm’n, [2015] A.B.C.A. 405, para. 8 (Can.). 
69. See generally Lorne Sossin, Empty Ritual, Mechanical Exercise or the Discipline of  
Deference? Revisiting the Standard of Review in Administrative Law, 27 ADV. Q. 478 (2003); JOSEPH 
T. ROBERTSON ET AL., JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS IN CANADA: ITS 
HISTORY AND FUTURE 95–110 (2014). 
70. Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigr.), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at para. 33 
(Can.). 
71. Id.  
72. Id. 
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Making an evaluation of relative expertise has three  
dimensions: the court must characterize the expertise of the 
tribunal in question; it must consider its own expertise relative 
to that of the tribunal; and it must identify the nature of the 
specific issue before the administrative decision-maker  
relative to this expertise.73 
 
Reviewing courts in Canada have consistently given a wide berth to horse 
racing tribunals, particularly on issues involving the rules of racing and the  
integrity of the sport: areas uniquely familiar to the members of such bodies.  
Thus, in relative terms, “the expertise of this tribunal [the Alberta Horse  
Racing Industry Appeal Tribunal] is much greater than that of the reviewing 
court when an assessment of their knowledge in relation to horse racing in the 
province is concerned.”74  Indeed, in matters more equine-centric than  
conceptually legal in nature, it is submitted that such tribunals are, for all  
practical purposes, paramount entities.  As explained by Chief Justice Jenkins 
of the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court – Trial Division: 
 
The Legislature has thereby [by the enactment of the Maritime 
Provinces Harness Racing Commission Act] created a body 
with expertise and entrusted it with very broad powers to  
govern the sport of harness racing.  All of this appears  
consistent with the jurisprudence from other jurisdictions  
regarding the regulation of harness racing.  There appears to 
be a consensus within the jurisprudence that there is a state  
interest in very rigid control of harness racing, which is rooted 
in objectives of protecting the health of the horses, protecting 
the state’s substantial revenues derived from taxes on  
legalized pari-mutuel betting, and protecting patrons of the 
sport from being defrauded.75 
 
From a practical perspective, it is important to point out that lawyers who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73. Id.  
74. Hennessy v. Horse Racing Alberta, [2006] A.J. No. 1613, para. 16 (Can. A.B. Ct. Q.B.).  See 
Scott v. Ontario (Racing Comm’n), [2009] O.J. No. 2858, para. 28 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J. Div. Ct.).  
75. Chappell v. Maritime Provinces Harness Racing Comm’n, [2008] P.E.I.J. No. 26 (Can. P.E.I. 
Sup. Ct. Tr. Div.). 
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appear before a racing commission are typically well-briefed as a result of 
maintaining a practice that regularly involves race-horsing issues.  To draw 
from the cowboy vernacular, such appearances would not be counsel’s “first 
time at the rodeo.”  What that means is equine-related lexicon comes naturally, 
understanding investigative disclosure is more likely achieved by the lawyer 
in-house and without expert witness assistance, and resolution discussions are 
more easily engaged, with matters concluded more expeditiously and  
satisfactorily.76 
B. Evidentiary Thresholds and the Overall Standard of Proof 
The rules of evidence that control a criminal case are often daunting in 
their detail and labyrinthine in their navigation.77  Relatedly, the criminal 
standard of proof is one that requires the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Although proof to an absolute certainty is not the measure, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a very high and exacting standard.78  It is a 
given that when the liberty of the subject hangs in the balance, a combination 
of reliable and highly persuasive evidence must be marshalled to tip the scales 
that otherwise maintain the presumption of innocence.79  Such exacting  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76. See BROWN & RANKIN, supra note 66, at 325–53 (for a general discussion of the relative  
expertise of regulatory tribunals (environmental and occupation health & safety bodies) as compared 
to criminal courts). 
77. R. v. Karaibrahimovic (2002), A.B.C.A. 102, para. 64 (Can.).   Justice of Appeal, O’Leary, of 
the Alberta Court of Appeal colors the complexity of evidence as it relates to jurors, noting,  
 
I do not doubt that the average modern juror is better educated and has more worldly  
experience than his earlier counterpart.  In my opinion that does not eliminate or reduce 
the need for juries to receive instructions on the evidence.  Today’s society is more  
complex, crime more sophisticated, scientific evidence more difficult to understand, and 
the rules of evidence more subtle. 
 
78. See R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, para. 25 (Can.) (where the Court states,  
 
Nor is it helpful to describe proof beyond a reasonable doubt simply as proof to a “moral 
certainty” . . . . Thus, if the standard of proof is explained as equivalent to “moral  
certainty” without more, jurors may think that they are entitled to convict if they feel  
“certain,” even though the Crown has failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt).  
 
See also Woolmington v. D.P.P. (1936), [1935] A.C. 462, 481 (H.L.) (Wherein, the famous Lord 
Stanley commented, “Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always 
to be seen, that is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt.”). 
79. In Canada, the presumption of innocence is a constitutional imperative and an enshrined right.   
See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B 
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standards, however, are not applicable to administrative proceedings, which 
“are civil, not criminal in nature.”80  As was explained by the ORC in an  
attempt to more precisely describe its adjudicative process:  
 
[T]he civil standard applies.  However, the evidential burden 
remains as cogent, clear and convincing as it applies to the  
elements which must be proved – all to be assessed in context 
and that context includes the seriousness of the consequences.  
It would be patently and grievously wrong to act upon  
evidence which is unclear and unconvincing.81  
 
Certainly, “[a] higher standard of justice is required when the right to  
continue one’s profession or employment is at stake.”82  However, the fact  
remains that the Statutory Powers Procedure Act83 (“SPPA”) governs all  
administrative tribunals in the province of Ontario and, as such, the ORC “is 
not bound by the strict rules of evidence applicable in criminal trials.”84   
Section 15(1)–(3) of the SPPA reads as follows: 
 
15(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), a tribunal may admit 
as evidence at a hearing, whether or not given or proven under 
oath or affirmation or admissible as evidence in a court,  
 
(a) Any oral testimony; and  
 
(b) Any document or other thing, 
 
relevant to the subject-matter of the proceeding and may act 
on such evidence, but the tribunal may exclude anything  
unduly repetitious. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.) at § 11(d), which reads, “Any person charged with an offence 
has the right (d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.” 
80. Scott, [2009] O.J. No. 2858 at para. 39. 
81. Re Wallis, [2011] O.R.C.D. No. 39, para. 156 (Can. Ont. Rac. Com.).  
82. Kane v. Bd. of Governors of U.B.C., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1105, para. 2 (Can.). 
83. Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (Can.) [hereinafter SPPA]. 
84. Polifroni (Re), [2012] O.R.C.D. No. 22, para. 19 (Can. Ont. Rac. Com.); see Ontario Racing 
Comm’n v. Hudon, [2008] O.J. No. 5313, para. 22–36 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J. Div. Ct.) (describing the 
reviewing logic of the Ontario Divisional Court). 
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(2) Nothing is admissible in evidence at a hearing, 
 
(a) That would be inadmissible in a court by reason of 
any privilege under the law of evidence; or  
 
(b) That is inadmissible by the statute under which the 
proceeding arises or any other statute. 
 
(3) Nothing in subsection (1) overrides the provisions of any 
Act expressly limiting the extent to or purposes for which any 
oral testimony, documents or things may be admitted or used 
in evidence in any proceeding.85 
 
As a consequence of the foregoing relaxation of the admissibility of  
evidence and the standard of proof, it only stands to reason that the preferred 
prosecution forum would be the regulatory tribunal rather than a court of  
criminal jurisdiction.  This, of course, assumes that the regulatory tribunal, in 
addition to being an expert in its field, is also effective in protecting the  
interests of horse racing and deterring those who would compromise the  
integrity of the sport.  As will be discussed in due course, there is an argument 
to be made that regulatory sanctions may no longer be effective in deterring 
the most perfidious of regulatory scheme offenders. 
C. Membership and its Associated Obligations 
Another reason why it has traditionally been preferable that horse racing 
misconduct, even if it may also constitute criminal behaviour, be dealt with by 
an oversight tribunal rather than by a criminal court is because of the  
significance of licensing membership in the horse racing industry.  By  
applying for and obtaining a licence, the licensee gives “tacit consent to the 
reasonable enforcement of the rules.”86  In Ontario, the Racing Commission 
Act87 established a Commission in order to govern, direct, and regulate horse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85. SPPA, supra note 83 at § 15(1)–(3). 
86. Ozubko and Chabot v. Manitoba Horse Racing Comm’n, [1987] 1 W.W.R. 149, para. 27 
(Man. C.A.).  
87. Racing Commission Act, S.O. 2000, c. 20.  On April 1, 2016, the Horse Racing License Act 
came into force, effectively repealing the Racing Commission Act.  Under the new Act, horse racing 
is regulated by the Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario.  
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racing provincially and make rules that apply to all Standardbred raceways and 
participants.88  Specifically, the Ontario Rules of Standardbred Racing 200889 
state that “[e]very person licensed by the commission is deemed to have 
agreed to abide by the conditions set out in the application . . . for the licence, 
the license itself, the Act, the rules and regulations thereunder.”90 
Along with the privileges of membership come related obligations,  
including an obligation to accept a reduced expectation of privacy.  Whether 
the licensee be an owner, breeder, driver, trainer, groomer, or other associated 
person for the betterment of the sport, expectations of privacy for such  
individuals on Commission grounds (i.e. raceway property) pale in  
comparison to those of the general citizenry.91  Such is the quid pro quo of the 
licensing compact.  Such strictures are necessary in order to maintain the  
public’s trust in the integrity of horse racing.  To exemplify the point, the  
following non-exhaustive list of rules are highlighted:  
 
1.04   Ignorance of the rules will not be accepted as an excuse 
for their violation; 
 
6.29  Whenever reasonable grounds exist for a belief that any 
participant can give material evidence that would aid in the 
detection or exposure of any fraud or wrongdoing concerning 
racing, such participant shall, on the order of the judges or 
other authorized official, be compelled to testify by  
deposition, affidavit or to provide documentary disclosure.  
Failure of any participant to comply will result in immediate 
full suspension; 
 
6.48.02  The entry of a horse to race in Ontario shall  
constitute permission for a person designated by the Director 
to collect or otherwise obtain a biological sample from or of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88. Id. at §§ 1, 6, 11. 
89. See Rules of Standardbred Racing, ONTARIO RACING COMMISSION, 2008 [hereinafter Rules]; 
see also Racing Commission Act, supra note 87, at § 11; see Ontario Harness Horse Ass’n. v. Ontario 
Racing Comm’n et al., [2002] O.J. No. 2409, para. 34–35, 48–56 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (QL). 
90. Rules, supra note 89, at Rule 3.03.01. 
91. Ozubko, at para. 3–6; see Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504 at para. 41 (In the search and  
seizure ruling released on December 31, 2012, the Court found that, “[a]s a licensee of the [Ontario 
Racing Commission], Mr. Riesberry agrees to a drastically reduced expectation of privacy while on 
Raceway grounds.”). 
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that horse for purposes of testing . . .; 
 
10.02  The Director shall have the right to enter upon the 
buildings, stables, rooms, vehicles or other places within the 
grounds of any Association for the purpose of examining, 
searching, inspecting and seizing the personal property and  
effects of any person in or upon such place; 
 
10.03  Participants acting in any capacity at a race meeting 
approved by the Commission, by so participating, consent to 
the examination, search and inspection referred to in the rules, 
and to the seizure of any hypodermic syringe, hypodermic 
needle or any other device described in the rules, and all drugs 
and medicaments including those listed in 6.46.01 or any kind 
which might be in his or her possession.  Any drugs,  
medicaments or other material or devices seized may be  
forwarded by the Commission to the official chemist for  
analysis; 
 
36.06  ORC Representatives may conduct unannounced 
searches where there are reasonable grounds to believe a  
prohibited substance is present on ORC licensed premises in 
violation of the Rules of Racing or specific track rules.   
Prohibited substances include illicit drugs and prescribed 
medications possessed without a legally obtained prescription 
as set out in Rule 36.02;  
 
36.07  Designated Licensees are subject to testing in the  
following situations:  
 
(c) drug testing which will take place on an unannounced 
basis throughout the racing season.  Selection for testing 
will be handled through an independent selection system 
managed by the ORC’s Program Administrator; (d)  
alcohol testing at any time that they are engaged in the 
business of racing at a licensed facility.92  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92. Rules, supra note 89. 
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It is obvious that the Rules, as promulgated by the oversight legislation, 
make it far easier for a prosecutor to make out a prima facie case.  Concerns 
about uncooperative licensee witnesses, unreasonable searches and seizures, 
and self-incrimination are largely rendered nugatory and accepted as being 
concessions made in the best interests of racing.  
D. Deterrence in a Regulatory Environment  
It is submitted that if there is an Achilles heel to administrative  
proceedings, it is the limitations in the area of sanctions.  Arguably, without a 
punitive bite, general deterrence efforts are illusory.  As explained in Scott v. 
Ontario Racing Commission:93 
 
The ORC is not empowered to impose true penal  
consequences, rather it is an agent of the Crown established in 
order to “govern, direct, control and regulate horse racing in 
Ontario in any or all of its forms” (see section 5 of the Act).  
These proceedings are neither criminal nor quasi-criminal.  In 
R v Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 SCR 541 at para 23, the Supreme 
Court of Canada many years ago considered the distinction, 
and concluded that penalties such as suspension and expulsion 
and fines imposed “for disciplinary matters which are  
regulatory, protective or corrective and which are primarily 
intended to maintain discipline, professional integrity and  
professional standards or to regulate conduct within a limited 
private sphere of activity” are not penal in the sense of  
criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions.  Rather, they are matters 
of licensing.94  
 
The language used by the ORC has on occasion reflected a frustration  
regarding the ineffectual nature of the penalty regime.95  References to  
significant suspensions and triple-digit fines are mentioned, yet the tribunals 
concede in the same breath that “[d]oping continues.”96  Academic articles are 
similarly disposed to point out as almost a given that regulatory sanctions  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93. [2009] O.J. No. 2858. 
94. Id. at para. 39. 
95. See Re Scott, [2007] O.R.C.D. No. 18, para. 75–84 (Can. Ont. Rac. Com.) 
96. Id. at para. 89. 
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remain inadequate: “Often the penalties are not enough to deter trainers,  
veterinarians and owners from administering illegal drugs to their horses, 
largely because of the stiff competition and enormous investments of time and 
money in racehorses.”97 
At least in the United States, “[o]ne of the primary reasons for trainer  
suspensions is the use of performance-enhancing drugs.”98  Canadian  
racehorse trainers have experienced loss of privileges for similar reasons.99  In 
any event, the messaging is clear that to whatever degree drugs have impacted 
Standardbred racing in Canada, it can only reduce public confidence in the 
sport each time it is uncovered.  Although “the relative ease of identifying  
examples does not reveal the actual frequency of doping,”100 the optics remain 
most destructive simply because in the ranks of the sport, “[n]o one wants a 
cheater.”101  Cheating is anathema to public confidence because the resulting 
spectacle renders otherwise noble pursuits illegitimate.  On explaining why PE 
opponents emphasize that cheating is the failure to reach one’s potential,  
Michael Shapiro points out that such perfidy brings about results that do “not 
come through our own normal development and effort, it is not natural, it has 
an external causal source, it challenges our existing identities, and it shreds our 
notions of merit.”102 
It is submitted that the decision to wade into the deep waters of the  
criminal justice system should not be taken lightly.  However, the time is  
arguably ripe in Canada to regularly bring criminal charges against those horse 
racing licensees who continue to use the crutch of PE drugs.  Not only would 
it potentially cause such licensees to take the “game” more seriously, it would 
also send an important message to the public that their confidence is respected.  
As explained by Kimberli Gasparon, “perhaps trainers would be less likely to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97. Kimberli Gasparon, The Dark Horse of Drug Abuse: Legal Issues of Administering  
Performance-Enhancing Drugs to Racehorses, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 199, 200 (2009); see 
Amy L. (Williams) Kluesner, And They’re Off: Eliminating Drug Use in Thoroughbred Racing, 3 
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297, 302 (2012). 
98. Kyle Cassidy, Comment, Reining in the Use of Performance Enhancing Drugs in  
Horseracing: Why a Federal Regulation Is Needed, 24 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L.121, 123 
(2014).  The author went on to point out on the same page that “[i]n 2009, only one of the top ten 
trainers by earnings did not have at least one drug related suspension.”  Id. 
99. Brief of the Crown Sentencing Authorities, Tabs 15–16, R. v. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. 6504 
(Can. Sup. Ct. J.) (CR-11-2450). 
100. Lisa Milot, Ignorance, Harm, and the Regulation of Performance-Enhancing Substances, 5 
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 91, 123 (2014). 
101. Re Scott, [2007] O.R.C.D. No. 18, at para. 78. 
102. Michael H. Shapiro, The Technology of Perfection: Performance Enhancement and the  
Control of Attributes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 11, 109 (1991). 
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dabble in prohibited drugs in order to avoid a criminal record.”103  Whether the 
same inability to deter the licensee bent on defrauding the betting public will 
be experienced in a criminal prosecution is open to debate.104  After all, the 
stigma attached to a criminal record, as observed by Richard Brown and  
Murray Rankin, 
 
is perhaps the greatest strength of prosecution, as well as one 
of its greatest limitations.  On the one hand, the stigma of 
conviction may lead legal actors to refrain from prosecuting 
employers who are thought not to warrant moral opprobrium.  
On the other hand, this stigma is almost certainly a potent  
deterrent.  More important, the symbolic condemnation of  
offenders through the criminal process may alter public  
attitudes about environmental and health and safety offences 
and thereby enhance compliance with regulatory  
requirements.  These benefits of the criminal process are more 
likely to be realized if prosecutions are brought under the 
Criminal Code rather than for regulatory offences, as is the 
present practice.105 
 
Certainly, the concept of general deterrence has its detractors, whether the 
forum be regulatory, civil, or criminal.106  However, thanks to the Riesberry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103. Gasparon, supra note 97, at 216. 
104. It is worth mentioning that the use of surveillance cameras in horseracing stalls, as utilized by 
the ORC, constitutes a variable factored into the deterrence assessment.  In the words of Andrew von 
Hirsch, being watched by a CCTV “is like conducting one’s activities in a space with a one-way  
mirror; while one may know that someone is watching behind the mirror, one does not necessarily 
know who they are or what they are looking for.”  Andrew von Hirsch, The Ethics of Public  
Television Surveillance, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 
65 (Andrew von Hirsch, et. al. eds., 2000).  While the use of CCTVs as instruments to facilitate the 
Big-Brother effect may give pause to horse racers thinking of using PE drugs, it does not do away 
with the use of PE.  Put simply, deterrence is unlikely to begin or end in the stall.  There are plenty of 
other places for horse racers to engage in such conduct. 
105. BROWN & RANKIN, supra note 66, at 348. 
106. See generally R. v. McLeod, [1992] S.J. No. 672 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (QL); see R. v. Clarke, 
[1998] O.J. No. 3521 (Can. Ont. Ct. J. Gen. Div.)(QL).  When considering the tenor of deterrence as 
it affects the human condition, consider also the philosophy in JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE 
OF PUNISHMENT I 61 (James T. McHugh, ed., Prometheus Books 2009) (1830): 
 
Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human action. When a man perceives or  
supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted upon in such a manner as tends, 
with a certain force, to withdraw him, as it were, from the commission of that act. If the 
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prosecution, at least there now is Canadian precedent from which further  
criminal jurisprudence can be developed. 
IV. PART III: SAFEGUARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE – THE 
TRIAL JUDES’S ROLE IN 
A. The Courtroom  
The tenor of the Riesberry prosecution not only sent a message to  
licensees and the public alike on the ramifications of cheating, but it also  
generated lessons for advocates and judges in “test cases” where the law is less 
than certain.  This is especially so where test cases provide insight into seldom 
employed provisions of the Code.  A test case has been described as, among 
many things, “a lawsuit brought to determine an unsettled legal point in some 
matter of broad application” or “an action whose result determines liability in 
other actions,” and even “a case setting a precedent for other cases.”107  
Following the culmination of its journey to the Supreme Court of Canada, 
the Riesberry matter returned to the trial court and a sentencing hearing was 
held on April 8, 2016, on the counts of fraud and attempted fraud over 
$5,000.00.  The Crown advanced the argument that the sentence should be  
appropriately tailored having regard for the joint submission suggesting a fine, 
and the fact that the matter was effectively a test case.  Notwithstanding these 
submissions, in his reasons for sentence, the trial judge remained hesitant to 
brand the matter before him as a test case and delivered the following  
comments: 
 
The Crown at the beginning of trial indicated that this was the 
first prosecution known to him of this type of conduct under 
the Criminal Code. Prior prosecutions had always been in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
apparent magnitude of that pain be greater than the apparent magnitude of the pleasure or 
good he expects to be the consequence of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from 
performing it. The mischief which would have ensued from the act, if performed, will  
also by that means be prevented.  
 
107. R. v. Nayanookeesic, [2005] 3 CNLR 257, para. 37–38 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).  It is  
important to note that Justice Pierce, cautions the reader that “[a] novel case, therefore, is not  
necessarily a test case.”  Id. at para 43.  While the Riesberry case is novel in the sense that it is the 
first of its kind to surface in Canada, it also raises important questions about whether horse racing 
constitutes a game for the purposes of cheating at play, whether the betting public, writ large, is put at 
risk of deprivation, and if so, whether such deprivation is too remote to satisfy the actus reus of the 
offence as it reads in the Code. 
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front of the Ontario Racing Commission to his knowledge. In 
that sense, the matter may loosely be termed a “test case.”108 
 
Notwithstanding the court’s reasons, the authors submit that the legal  
issues argued in Riesberry indeed evinced the trademark of a test case.  As a 
result, issues of trial fairness take on a heightened significance.  Specifically, 
on this point, lessons from Riesberry on the principles of natural justice and 
the concept of audi alteram partem emerge as underpinning themes.  The  
unexpected use of ex juris case law in assessing whether a race is a game for 
the purposes of the Code is pivotal in this regard.  
The trial judge’s application of the Harless case, while permissible,  
particularly if viewed through the prism of the powers vested in a court of  
inherent jurisdiction,109 causes tension when met with the principles of natural 
justice.  In the discussion that follows, the importance of the principles of  
natural justice, in the context of allowing counsel to make submissions, serves 
as the locus of the authors’ critique.  At issue is to what extent the principles of 
fairness and natural justice are compromised when counsel is not afforded an 
opportunity to make submissions on a central feature in a case.  
1. Natural Justice, Fairness, and the Right to Make Submissions 
While the Riesberry case bears precedential hallmarks related to the  
intersection between dishonest sporting conduct and the criminal law, it also 
engenders debate on the parameters, if any, that accompany judicial discretion 
in determining novel questions of law.  The consideration and application of 
ex juris jurisprudence, as evidenced by the use of the Harless decision from 
the United States, without the opportunity for counsel to make submissions on 
its applicability clearly violated basic principles of natural justice.  Close  
examination of the trial court’s reasoning suggests that it overreached when it 
conscripted the use of the case as a vessel of interpretation.  The authors  
respectfully submit that the use of Harless to make an adjudicative finding on 
what constituted a “game,” for Canadian criminal law purposes, set a  
dangerous precedent.  Not only was it inapplicable when it came to  
determining the law of the land, its incorporation into the decision came ex 
improvisio.   
The opportunity to make submissions before the court is inextricably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108. Trial Transcript, Reasons for Sentence at para. 1, lines 26–32, para. 2, line 2, Riesberry 
(2016) (No. CR-11-2450) (emphasis added). 
109. See infra Part III(b) (exploring the significance of this label “court of inherent jurisdiction”).  
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linked to natural justice as a foundational component of the adversarial  
system.  Natural justice is considered “‘fair play in action.’  Nor is it a leaven 
to be associated only with judicial or quasi-judicial occasions.”110  The concept 
of natural justice is predicated on the duty to act both fairly and judicially.  
While both elements are distinct on their face, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has signaled a fusion of their functional underpinnings.  In Martineau v. 
Matsqui Institution,111 a decision involving the judicial review of  
administrative action, Chief Justice Dickson suggested there was a close nexus 
between fairness and the principles of natural justice, and provided the  
following insight: 
 
The fact that a decision-maker does not have a duty to act  
judicially, with observance of formal procedure which that 
characterization entails, does not mean that there may not be a 
duty to act fairly which involves importing something less 
than the full panoply of conventional natural justice rules.  In 
general, courts ought not to seek to distinguish between the 
two concepts, for the drawing of a distinction between a duty 
to act fairly, and a duty to act in accordance with the rules of 
natural justice, yields an unwieldy conceptual framework . . . .  
It is wrong, in my view, to regard natural justice and fairness 
as distinct and separate standards and to seek to define the 
procedural content of each.112  
 
While much of the jurisprudence emerging from the Supreme Court of 
Canada discusses natural justice in the context of administrative  
decision-making tribunals, the principles flowing from the concept apply 
equally to traditional judicial forums.  Thus, if the principles of natural justice, 
rooted in fairness and the concept of audi alteram partem,113 apply to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110. Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Comm’rs, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311, para. 1–33 
(Can.).  
111. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602 (Can.) (QL). 
112. Id. at 628–30 (emphasis added). 
113. The common law principle of audi alteram partem refers to the duty to hear both sides of a 
case, and remains central to the concept of procedural fairness.  The essence of the audi alteram  
partem rule is to give all parties a fair opportunity of answering the case for or against them.  Natural 
justice generally requires that persons liable to be directly affected by proposed administrative acts, 
decisions or proceedings be given adequate notice of what is proposed, so that they may be in a  
position: (1) to make representations on their own behalf; or (2) to appear at a hearing or inquiry (if 
one is to be held); and (3) to prepare their own case and answer the case they have to meet.  Louis 
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administrative tribunals, then their force should weigh even stronger in a  
criminal court where liberty interests are always at stake.  Referring to the 
principles of natural justice, Justice Lebel squared this issue perfectly,  
observing: “[a]s the maxim goes, the goal is not only that justice should be 
done but also that justice should be seen to be done.”114   
Appellate courts provide a breadth of insight on the principle of trial  
fairness.  For example, in R. v. Ranger,115 the Court of Appeal for Ontario  
remarked that “the trial judge’s role will be circumscribed by the need to  
ensure trial fairness” and that the “trial judge’s failure to notify counsel of his 
intention to charge the jury on this additional basis of liability undermined the 
appellant’s ability to make full answer and defence.”116  Drawing on the spirit 
of natural justice in R. v. Griffith,117 Justice of Appeal Rosenberg, rebuked a 
lower court decision for its decision to enter an acquittal without providing the 
parties an opportunity to make submissions.118 
Courts have explored how the principle of fairness is interlaced with the 
opportunity for counsel to make submissions.  Indeed, this very issue arose in 
R. v. G.W.C.,119 where the Alberta Court of Appeal considered whether the  
trial court erred by not affording counsel an opportunity to make submissions 
after rejecting a joint position on sentence.  Justice of Appeal Berger’s,  
reasons capture the solicitude of the court: 
 
[T]he procedure followed by the sentencing judge in rejecting 
the joint submission in this case is a matter of concern.  Once 
a sentencing judge concludes that he might not accede to a 
joint submission, fundamental fairness dictates that an  
opportunity be afforded to counsel to make further  
submissions in an attempt to address the sentencing judge’s 
concerns before the sentence is imposed . . . As a result, they 
were afforded no opportunity to address that concern.  Indeed, 
had the sentencing judge made his concern known to counsel 
in a timely fashion, the foundation upon which the joint  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lebel, Notes for an Address: Reflections on Natural Justice and Procedural Fairness in Canadian 
Administrative Law, 26 CAN. J. ADMIN. L. & PRAC. 51, 53 (2013). 
114. Id. at 51. 
115. (2003) 67 O.R. (3d) 1 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
116. Id. at para. 133. 
117. [2013] 116 O.R. (3d) 561 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
118. Id. at para. 33–36. 
      119. [2001] 5 W.W.R. 230  (Can. A.B. C.A.).  
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submission rested might well have been laid.  I do not suggest 
that any particular procedure is de rigueur; I say only that the 
principle of audi alteram partem should be followed.120 
 
The ratio decidendi in G.W.C. is not exclusive to criminal law.  Similar 
qualms were expressed by the Federal Court of Canada in Lahnalampi v.  
Canada (Attorney General),121 a case involving the judicial review of a  
grievance application heard by the Public Service Labour Relations Board.  At 
issue was whether the adjudicator breached the principles of fairness by not 
allowing the grievers to make submissions on whether they were readily  
available for work.  Justice Mosely explained the court’s concern about an  
adjudicative body drawing factual conclusions absent hearing submissions 
from both parties:  
 
I agree with the applicants that the adjudicator contravened 
audi alteram partem by deciding the matter on the basis that 
the applicants were not “readily available” for overtime work.  
Contrary to the respondent’s suggestion, the applicants did not 
undertake the risk of not making submissions on the meaning 
of “readily available” with full knowledge that it might lead to 
a negative decision.  To the contrary, the applicants did not 
make such submissions because the adjudicator had caused 
them to believe that he would not be deciding that question.122  
 
Justice Mosely commented further on audi alteram partem, suggesting a 
heightened awareness for the principle in matters involving novel issues that 
are ultimately driven by material facts in dispute: 
 
I reject the respondent’s suggestion that audi alteram partem 
is relaxed to the point of permitting a decision-maker to  
decide issues that neither party addressed when these issues 
pertain to law or policy, as opposed to factual disputes . . . [A] 
decision maker cannot raise novel issues of any sort without 
bringing them to the attention of the parties.123  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120. Id. at para. 26. 
121. [2014] F.C. 1136 (Can.). 
122. Id. at para. 42. 
123. Id. at para. 49 (emphasis added). 
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It is not unreasonable to suggest that judges are beholden to a heightened 
sense of obligation to employ the principles of fairness and natural justice 
when “novel issues” are brought before the court.  At its core, the Lahnalampi 
decision suggests that there are inherent dangers associated with drawing  
inaccurate conclusions on evidentiary matters that betray the factual record.124 
Specifically, these decisions elevate the premium placed on submissions 
made by counsel during the course of a hearing.  A closer glance at the  
treatment of joint submissions in Canadian courts is indicative of this  
premium.  For example, in the seminal case of R. v. Cerasuolo,125 the Court of 
Appeal for Ontario explained the high threshold to which courts must adhere 
prior to rejecting the joint submissions of counsel, urging judges to be  
deferential to them “unless [they are] contrary to the public interest and the 
sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”126  The  
rationale is to “foster confidence in an accused . . . that the joint submission he 
. . . obtained in return for a plea of guilty will be respected by the sentencing 
judge.”127  Joint submissions are but one of a myriad of examples where  
counsel’s submissions carry significant weight, no doubt attributable to their 
roles as officers of the court. 
The foregoing jurisprudence captures the essence of the principles of  
natural justice and fairness as they relate to the lawyer-judge dynamic at trial.  
The jurisprudence uniformly supports the proposition that counsel is entitled 
to make submissions.  Whether or not the submissions will sway the question 
of the day is a matter for the trier of fact to decipher.  However, at the heart of 
this proposition is the notion that the adversarial system cannot thrive if a  
judicial officer circumvents its fulcrum, inadvertently or otherwise.  
One cannot help but wonder what drove the trial court to utilize an ex juris 
case to wield precedent on the meaning of a Canadian statute, absent any input 
from counsel.128  The American case undergirded the court’s understanding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124. Lahnalampi, [2014] F.C. 1136; see R. v. Douglas, [2002] J.Q. No. 418, para. 18 (Can. Q.C. 
C.A.) (Where the Quebec Court of Appeal strongly criticized the rationale of the trial judge at the 
sentencing hearing.  Without any evidence before the court, the judge found that the accused supplied 
a weapon used during the course of a robbery.  Justice Fish poignantly remarked on the error of the 
trial judge, writing, “This was not a benign error.  I fear, on the contrary, that it proved to be  
malignant – certainly in the sense of ‘harmful’, and probably in the sense of ‘infectious’ as well.”). 
125. [2001] O.J. No. 359 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (QL). 
126. Id. at para. 8. 
127. Id.  To appreciate the impact of judicial unfairness in the context of jury trials, see R. v. 
Baltovich, [2004] O.J. No. 4880, para. 118, 127, 146–49 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (QL). 
128. Justice Cromwell, expressed the same curiosity about this very point on behalf of the  
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that horseracing is a game of pure skill.  However, the decision was made in 
an adversarial vacuum.  Thus, the moral of this critique is that counsel must be 
kept apprised of judicial concerns regarding issues of law, particularly when 
they may be dispositive of a significant point in the litigation.  Moreover, 
where foreign case law is utilized for the insight it offers,129 its interpretation 
and value is often met with competing views.  One may wonder whether a 
judge is vested with unfettered judicial discretion to use foreign case law when 
presiding in a court of inherent jurisdiction.  The question, perhaps better put, 
is how the balance of such discretion should be exercised, if at all, in the  
absence of direct input from counsel. 
3. Inherent Jurisdiction as Compared to Judicial Discretion: Does the Former 
Eclipse the Latter? 
Judicial rationale is shielded by the armor of judicial independence, a  
constitutional convention that fares strong against outside scrutiny.130  In many 
ways, the perfect storm may lurk on the horizon when judicial discretion  
combines with the powers of a court of inherent jurisdiction.  The result can 
properly serve as a gateway to developments in the common law.  However, 
the authors submit that the trial decision in Riesberry constituted no such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Supreme Court of Canada, stating, “It is somewhat unclear to what extent the trial judge relied on this 
authority as stating the law in Canada.  However, to the extent that he did so, he made legal error.”  
Riesberry (2016) at para. 11. 
129. See generally Brian Manarin, Extraordinary Offenders in Our Midst: An Evaluation of an 
American Interpretive Solution and its Application to Section 745(b) of Canada’s Criminal Code, 22 
TUL J. INT’L & COMP. L. 63 (2013).  For a discussion on the Supreme Court of Canada’s amenability 
to the use of foreign case law in its judgments as a matter of practice, see Rebecca Lefler, A  
Comparison of Comparison: Use of Foreign Case Law as Persuasive Authority by the United States 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the High Court of Australia, 11 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 165 (2001).  For a view strongly against the practice, see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
130. Ref re Remuneration of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, para. 109 
(Can.).  
 
Judicial independence is an unwritten norm, recognized and affirmed by the preamble to 
the Constitution Act, 1867.  In fact, it is in that preamble, which serves as the grand  
entrance hall to the castle of the Constitution, that the true source of our commitment to 
this foundational principle is located.”  To be clear, the authors do not take issue with  
judicial discretion as a necessary corollary to judicial independence, but are interested in 
the manner in which such discretion is exercised, and whether it is decipherable on the 
face of a judgment.  
 
Id. 
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storm. 
“Discretion” is an amorphous concept. Barry Hoffmaster writes that the 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines the term as “the action of  
discerning or judging; judgment” and the “liberty or power of deciding, or of 
acting according to one’s own judgment; uncontrolled power of disposal.”131  
In law, discretion is defined as “the power to decide, within the limits allowed 
by positive rules of law, as to punishments, remedies, or costs, and generally 
to regulate matters of procedure and administration.”132  Such a definition is 
arguably as unwieldy as the judicial actions it serves to support, leaving a 
broad ambit of creative licence with a judicial officer. 
Judicial behavior is no archetypal construct—it is submitted that it cannot 
be compartmentalized or understood in typologies.  Supporting this  
proposition, Kent Greenwalt comments on the performance parameters that 
emerge from discretion in the judicial realm: 
 
[I]n ordinary discourse the existence of discretion turns on the 
range of performance that will be deemed proper by those 
people to whom the person making decisions is responsible.  It 
does not turn on the duty of the decision-maker  
conscientiously to reach the best decision he can under a 
standard that may theoretically provide an objectively “right” 
answer.133  
 
Greenwalt’s position stands for the proposition that judges are alive to a 
silent audience to who they are responsible, ultimately surrendering to  
extrinsic forces transcending judicial objectivity.  This begs the question: to 
who are judges responsible?  When considering the literature on judicial  
discretion, one should give pause to whether the appointment versus election 
scheme in Canada and the United States, respectively, bears influence on the 
spectrum of discretion.  While the difference alters the perception of political 
involvement at the judicial level in Canada,134 the underlying similarity  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131. Barry Hoffmaster, Understanding Judicial Discretion, 1 L. & PHIL. 21, 52 (1982). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
134. Note that Canadian judges are appointed by provincial, territorial, or federal governments.  
The appointment schemes vary depending on the ordinal ranking of courts.  For example, provincial 
court judges are appointed by way of a self-driven application process sent to regional committees, 
while judges of the superior, territorial, appeal courts, and the Supreme Court of Canada are appoint-
ed by Canada’s Attorney General. Off. of the Comm’r for Fed. Jud. Aff. Can., Process for an  
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between the judicial branches of both countries is their separation from the 
legislative process, which inevitably calls for the task of legislative  
interpretation.  
Juxtaposed with Greenwalt, Justice Richard A. Posner turns to internal 
variants that influence how judges think.  In studying what drives judicial 
thinking, he writes extensively on experience, akin to training, which can  
“inculcate values that can influence judicial behaviour.”135  He adds that 
“[i]ntuition plays a major role in judicial as in most decision making” and “is 
best understood as a capability for reaching down into a subconscious  
repository of knowledge acquired from one’s education and particularly one’s 
experiences.”136  As explained by Justice Posner, “intuition will enable a more 
accurate as well as a speedier decision than analytical reasoning would.”137  
Aptly, he describes judges’ decision-making methods as “‘inevitably opaque’ 
because they involve telescoped rather than step-by-step thinking.”138 
On Ronald Dworkin’s account, judges are not elected and therefore are not 
responsible to the electorate as legislators are, which obviates their  
responsibility to the majority when they make law.139  Unlike Justice Posner, 
and very much like Greenwalt, Dworkin is of the view that judges ought to be 
driven by public rather than private standards: 
 
The most important difference, for the present purpose, is that 
the judge has no authoritative manual exhaustively listing the 
standards against which he must make his decision.  If the 
judge were free to adopt his personal preferences as legal 
standards, then indeed his decisions would be chosen.  But he 
is not.  He is subject to the overriding principle that good  
reasons for judicial decision [sic] must be public standards 
rather than private prejudice.  And he is subject to principles 
stipulating how such standards shall be established and what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Application for Appointment, http://www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/process-regime-
eng.html#Provincial (last visited Dec. 14, 2017); see Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 
(U.K.), § 96, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II, no 5 (Can.); see also Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c J-1, § 
3 (generally for eligibility requirements). 
135. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 95 (2008). 
136. Id. at 107. 
137. Id. at 108. 
138. Id. at 109. 
139. Hoffmaster, supra note 131, at 24. 
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judicial use shall be made of them.140  
 
If, according to Dworkin, judges are subject to principles circumscribing 
how far their discretion can be exercised, then arguably, the trial court’s  
interpretation of the word “game” in Riesberry, using inapplicable case law, 
abrogates the legal procedure by which adjudicative facts are normally  
adopted with respect to foreign case law.  
Normally, when a Canadian court relies on foreign law, the party adducing 
or asserting the law must provide expert evidence to prove it as a matter of 
fact.141  Otherwise, judicial notice will only be taken of Canadian legislation, 
or more specifically, acts of Parliament.142  At its essence: 
 
Judicial notice dispenses with the need for proof of facts that 
are clearly uncontroversial or beyond reasonable dispute.  
Facts judicially noticed are not proved by evidence under 
oath.  Nor are they tested by cross-examination.  Therefore, 
the threshold for judicial notice is strict: a court may properly 
take judicial notice of facts that are either: (1) so notorious or 
generally accepted as not to be the subject of debate among 
reasonable persons; or (2) capable of immediate and accurate 
demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of  
indisputable accuracy.143 
 
Despite the foregoing, a Canadian court may also look to cases from  
foreign jurisdictions to draw assistance when engaged in an interpretive effort.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140. Ronald Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624, 634–35 (1963) (emphasis added). 
141. Xiao v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] 4 F.C.R. 510, at para. 24 
(Can. Fed. Ct.).  
142. See Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-5, § 17 [hereinafter CEA].   
 
Judicial notice shall be taken of all Acts of the Imperial Parliament, of all ordinances 
made by the Governor in Council, or the lieutenant governor in council of any province or 
colony that, or some portion of which, now forms or hereafter may form part of Canada, 
and all of the Acts of the legislature of any such province or colony, whether enacted  
before or after the passing of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
 
Id.  See also id. at § 18 (“Judicial notice shall be taken of all Acts of Parliament, public or 
private, without being specially pleaded.”). 
143. R. v. Spence, [2005] S.C.J. No. 74, para. 53 (Can.) (QL). 
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Indeed, such an approach can be inspirational.144  
The use of the Harless case on the definition of “game” was central to two 
of the counts on the indictment in Riesberry.  Making the factual  
determination of a game, as defined for the purposes of the Code, would serve 
to underpin the actus reus of the offence.  The authors express concern about 
why the post position of the horse, which is randomly computer generated, 
was not the subject of judicial notice given the contents of the Rules of  
Racing.145  Presumably, this recognition would have resulted in a factual  
finding that horseracing is a game of mixed chance and skill.  
Despite the contrary views espoused by the authors, one might properly 
argue that the trial judge’s assessment of Harless was squarely within his 
bounds as a judge presiding over a court of inherent jurisdiction,146 thus  
informing the title of this section.  If inherent jurisdiction provides more  
discretionary latitude, then perhaps that latitude can be more broadly  
employed to allow for the consideration of foreign jurisprudence.  Importantly, 
while judicial discretion and inherent jurisdiction resemble one another and 
overlap, they ought to be kept distinct.147 
Historically, the development of “inherent jurisdiction” was spawned from 
two powers: (1) punishment for contempt of court and its process; and (2)  
regulating the practice of the court and preventing the abuse of its process, 
particularly by staying actions that were shown to be frivolous and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144. See United Food v. Kmart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083, para. 51–55 (Can.) (where the 
Supreme Court of Canada heard a labor dispute between a labor group and an employer.  In  
considering whether a statutory definition of picketing violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, the Court adopted a line of thinking from American jurisprudence proffering the view that 
conventional picketing is distinguishable from many other forms of leafleting, and that the activity of 
leafleting can be carried out in a permissible manner that is innocuous and appropriate.); see  R. v. 
Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, para. 77–85 (Can.) (where the Supreme Court of Canada utilized  
American case law to assess the rights that should be afforded to an accused in post-conviction  
proceedings as it relates to dangerous offender designations.). 
145. See Rules, supra note 89, at ch. 2 (defining “post position” as being “the position assigned or 
drawn for a horse at the start of the race.”).  
146. Courts of inherent jurisdiction are not defined in the Canadian Constitution, but are  
referenced the Constitution Act, 1867, at § 96.  The general jurisdiction of the High Court as a  
superior court of record is, broadly speaking, unrestricted and unlimited in all matters of substantive 
law, both civil and criminal, except insofar as that has been taken away in unequivocal terms by  
statutory enactment.  It exercises the “full plenitude of judicial powers in all matters concerning the 
general administration of justice within its area.”  The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBLEMS 1970, 23–24 (Lord Lloyd of Hampstead & George Shwarzenberger eds., Steven & 
Sons 1970) [hereinafter Inherent Jurisdiction]. 
147. Inherent Jurisdiction, supra note 146, at 25. 
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vexatious.148   The juridical basis of this jurisdiction is therefore the authority 
to uphold, protect, and fulfill the function of administering justice according to 
law in a regular, orderly, and effective manner.  
A crucial takeaway from this historical backdrop is that a court of inherent 
jurisdiction has full reign over procedural matters before it, which is part and 
parcel of the manner in which the administration of justice is employed.  
However, if the inherent function of the court may be defined as a “residual” 
source of power upon which to draw when necessary, and it is equitable to do 
so, and to “do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between 
them,” then the necessary corollary must be that parties to a matter should  
always be permitted to make submissions on dispositive issues.149  These very 
considerations ought to have, at the least, occupied the mind of the trial court 
prior to engaging the Harless-favored interpretation that emerged in Riesberry.  
Procedurally, such an opportunity not only bespeaks the right to make a full 
answer and defence150 at its highest, but it embodies how justice should be  
delivered through the adversarial system.  
V. PART IV: ETHICAL ISSUES INVOLVING ANIMALS AND THEIR USE IN 
SPORTING EVENTS  
In addition to the precedential legal value that the prosecution knew would 
arise from the Riesberry case, questions regarding the ethical treatment of  
animals remained relevant throughout the trial and at the sentencing hearing 
following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decree.151  Indeed, the misuse of 
race horses was, in part, the impetus to criminalize doping practices.152  Two 
particular questions flowing from the theme of ethical treatment constitute the 
focus of the final part of this article, namely the definition of “cheating” and 
whether or not such an illegitimate means of gaining athletic accolades is any 
more or less aggravating when an animal is used as a conduit.153  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148. Id. at 25–26.  The basis underpinning courts of inherent jurisdiction was that their powers 
were not derived by statute, but rather imbued in the very nature of the court.  It is said that “such a 
power is intrinsic in a superior court; it is the very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute.”  
Id. at 27. 
149. Forest Holdings Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, [1990] N.S.J. No. 230, para. 8 (Can. N.S. C.A.) 
(QL). 
150. Criminal Code, at § 650(3); Constitution Act, 1982, at § 7. 
151. Trial Transcript Reasons for Sentence, Riesberry, April 8, 2016, page 2, lines 12–20. 
152. One of the co-authors herein, Brian Manarin, was the trial prosecutor in Riesberry.  The  
impact that PE drugs have on race horses influenced his decision to bring the matter to trial. 
153. Trial Transcript Reasons for Sentence, supra note 151, at page 2, lines 12–20 (where the trial 
court states: “A more egregious aggravating factor is the fact that the horse is defenceless at the hands 
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In this part, the authors consider the etymology of cheating as a precursor 
to the ethical inquiry into animal welfare.  A discussion about the meaning of 
cheating as it relates to the use of PE drugs is considered.  What follows is a 
historical snapshot of the views advanced by early philosophical thinkers who 
opined on the ordinal ranking of species and the treatment of animals.  Against 
this backdrop, the implications of “doping” are contemplated by the authors 
through the lens of ethical debate. 
A. Revisiting the Etymology of Cheating and its Effect on Sporting 
Generally  
What is the rationale to prohibit cheating?  By what metric is cheating 
even measured?  Is it an inherent calculus or one that can only be divided 
when juxtaposed against fixed rules?  The answers to these questions will help 
the reader better understand why society generally places a premium on 
achievement through legitimate means.  As well, the answers will emphasize 
why there continues to be a need to lay open for scrutiny sporting endeavours 
that involve animals. 
In the first version of the Code in 1892,154 cheating at play was found  
co-mingled among fraud-related offences, indicating that the purpose of the 
section was about ensuring honest dealings when gambling over money and 
things of material value.155  Canadian legislative history reveals that cheating 
at play was given more of a stand-alone status in 1985 by virtue of the  
enactment of section 209 of the Code when Parliament sought to protect  
honesty in wagering that involved material value.156  Notwithstanding the  
relocation of the provision in the gaming-related offences years later, section 
209 still requires an “intent to defraud any person,” which appears to be  
consistent with its historical evolution and Parliament’s purpose in so enacting 
it.157  
Indeed, the definition of cheating carries a similar undertone.  Cheat as  
defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, means “to defraud” or “to practice  
deception.”158  Uniquely, Black’s classifies cheating as “the fraudulent  
obtaining of another’s property by means of a false symbol or token, or by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of an unscrupulous trainer . . . the human being . . . has the intellect to make the choice and assume 
the health risks attendant with their actions.”). 
154. Criminal Code, 1892, 55 & 56 Vict., c 164, §395. 
155. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504 at para. 41. 
156. Id. at para. 39. 
157. Id. 
158. Cheat, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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other illegal practices,” and ultimately advises its readership to “see fraud” for 
further explanatory value.159  It comes as no surprise then that the legislative 
backdrop of this provision is inherently tied to the fraud-related provisions.  
Even more so, the nexus between cheating and fraud squarely fits the  
reasoning underpinning Justice Cromwell’s judgment for the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Riesberry, wherein he writes, “Mr. Riesberry knew that his  
dishonest conduct put bettors at risk of deprivation. That, after all, is what 
cheating is.”160  
The etymology of the word “cheat” as a form of fraud is not only reflected 
in the statutory wording of section 209, but it is also historically rooted in the 
acquisition of another’s property, triggering questions about possessory rights.  
The basic tenets of property law allow possessory rights to attach to  
inanimate objects, more often than not, carrying some form of monetary value.  
In the context of horse racing, a logical possessory component is linked to 
both ownership of the horse by the racing stakeholder and the monetary value 
that can be gained from the purse.  Perhaps this logic explains why section 209 
prohibits cheating in relation to both gaming and betting.161  The game is the 
process through which the potentially deceitful behavior occurs (i.e. the 
means), and the necessary corollary to the race, namely the betting, is the  
avenue for financial gain.  Considered wholly, the provision applies to  
multiple parties in a race, including those toiling on the racetrack and those 
who are betting on the performance of such participants.   
In an effort to define cheating in the sporting context, Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman and James E. Coleman Jr. provide a glimpse into this intuitively 
simple, yet abstract concept.  Their views embody competing stances on what 
constitutes cheating, suggesting that it need not always be deemed malignant:  
 
like obscenity, child maltreatment, and torture—it [cheating] 
is at least in some respects in the eye of the beholder.  For  
example, even if steroids did not have definitive or potential 
adverse health effects, we would believe that taking them  
under any circumstances is cheating because they  
fundamentally alter the athlete’s “natural” or “gifted” levels of 
physical and mental strength.162  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159. Cheating, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
160. Riesberry, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1167 at para. 32. 
161. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, at § 380(1). 
162. Doriane Lambelet Coleman & James E. Coleman Jr., The Problem of Doping, 57 DUKE L.J. 
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PE, according to Michael Shapiro, is said to be “inconsistent with a game 
or sport because it is viewed as a kind of cheating—not necessarily hidden or 
dishonest, but cheating nonetheless.”163  Despite the foregoing, Shapiro calls 
into question the orthodox discontentment with PE as a form of cheating: 
 
 Of course, [performance enhancing] cannot be inconsistent 
with the general idea of contests.  It is easy to imagine  
competitions in which the object is indeed to see who can best 
enhance performance in a technological or nontechnological 
way—as in muscle-building contests, with or without steroids.  
If a sport entails not just competition against current  
opponents but the possibility and desirability of record-
setting, it is not obvious why [performance enhancing] is  
always conceptually excluded. . . . Does a musician “cheat” 
when the accuracy of her performance is improved by the use 
of beta-blockers to control the physical effects of anxiety?  
Here the idea of cheating is linked to the compromise of  
identity and perhaps even more to unearned benefits:  
impairments are controlled by external means rather than by 
internal resources that constitute strength of character.164   
 
Two points emerge from Shapiro’s inquiry, namely, (1) the possibility that 
cheating is not inconsistent with contests per se if the idea is to assess who can 
most enhance themselves in the contest; and (2) while cheating could be 
linked to the compromise of identity and unearned benefits that are impacted 
by otherwise uncontrollable extrinsic factors, it is not clear why we should not 
countenance it in the context of a competition.  Standardbred horse racing is a 
contest involving drivers mounted on their sulkies pulled by their horses with 
the objective of ensuring that the horse runs the prescribed course in the 
quickest time possible.  On Shapiro’s account, PE may not be such a morally 
offensive concept if we define the game as a contest.  But, is not every game a 
contest of sort?  Surely, Shapiro did not mean to discount that proposition.  
Perhaps this explains why he qualifies his musings, asking whether cheaters 
can, or rather should, play the game.  He reviews the idea that a game can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1743, 1753 (2008) (emphasis added). 
163. Shapiro, supra note 102, at 61. 
164. Id. at 61–62 (emphasis added). 
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defined in such a way as to contemplate cheating, and in doing so, the more 
interesting question emerges as to what the canonical rules, practices,  
understandings, and frameworks of the game include.165  From this, one can 
deduce that Shapiro refers to the rules of the game as de facto arbiters in  
determining whether cheating has transpired.  Along this line of logic, the  
prohibition on specific PE drugs in the Ontario Standardbred Rules constitute 
the framework, and thus, any violation of that framework to gain a material 
benefit at the expense of the betting public must constitute cheating.  
Richard McLaren conducts a similar inquiry into the concept of cheating, 
linking it to a form of corruption as it relates to fair play.  He writes that PE 
drugs engender corruptive practices that effectively “rob[] [the] sport of its  
essential feature of uncertainty of the outcome and accelerates its spin into the 
forum of entertainment, and thus it no longer is sport.”166  He cites corruption 
as a violator of sporting integrity, the latter being something that “must be  
present for the sports enthusiast to believe that the outcome of a sporting  
competition is genuine.”167  In his view, public confidence in the structural 
makeup of the sport is compromised once doping is discovered, and that  
confidence is not easily retrievable because “[d]oping unfairly enhances the 
performance of those who engage in such practices, and causes cynicism 
among the viewing public of the natural abilities of athletes.”168  
A brief historical account reveals that orthodox views on doping, as a form 
of corruption and a variety of fraud, were also at issue in the early days of 
horse racing.  For example, by 1860 in the United States, racing was legalized 
in almost every state and by 1890, corruption and dishonesty ran so rampant 
on the racetrack that later years saw the decline in the number of racetracks in 
the country go from 314 to 25.169  Eventually, state racing commissions were 
formed to enforce rules adopted to protect and safeguard the horse-racing  
industry, including trainers, jockeys, owners, horses, and spectators, and  
preserve the integrity and fairness of the sport.170   
It is attractive to wonder whether the impugned status of American horse 
racing impacted, or was indeed paralleled in, neighbouring Canada.  This  
possibility gains traction given that the first codification of the cheating at play 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165. Id. at 61.  
166. Richard H. McLaren, Corruption: Its Impact on Fair Play, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 15, 15 
(2008). 
167. Id.  
168. Id. at 1516. 
169. Cassidy, supra note 98, at 126. 
170. Id. 
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provision in Canada occurred in the late Nineteenth Century.171  Thus, while 
the Riesberry case was the first to be criminally prosecuted in Canada, it was 
not the first of its kind.  
B. The Ethics of PE Drugs, also Known as “Doping” 
Without question, the science and technological growth of PE drugs  
pervade the world of sport now more than ever, emerging as a legitimate  
concern for organizations, associations, and leagues wishing to preserve the 
integrity of their respective sporting activities.  
Doping is not a new phenomenon to the sporting world.  Some data as far 
back as the Sixth Century BC, reveals that gladiators used stimulants when 
fighting in the Circus Maximus.  In the Third Century BC, Greek athletes used 
stimulants at the earliest of Olympic Games.  And, in the Middle Ages,  
competitors used stimulants while preparing for jousts.172  A worldwide  
response to regulation eventually surfaced and, in 1928, “the first official ban 
on ‘stimulating substances’ was introduced by the International Amateur  
Athletic Federation.”173   
Inevitably, the opportunity cost of using PE drugs imposes a high jeopardy 
on any athletic career.  Nevertheless, “[t]he enormous rewards for the winner 
[in competitive sporting], the effectiveness of the drugs, and the low rate of 
testing all combine to create a cheating ‘game’ that is irresistible to [many] 
athletes.”174  This reality inevitably contributes to factors, which cause some to 
succumb to the pressure to cheat.  
Despite the ramifications of PE drugs on an athlete’s reputation and  
integrity, even those at the vanguard of their chosen sport are not necessarily 
deterred from the perceived rewards of using PE drugs.  Several examples 
from the world of sport have attracted global headlines.  For example, in 2012, 
Lance Armstrong, the once heralded deity of professional cycling, made  
headlines for admitting that he used banned PE drugs, only after years of  
investigation by the United States Anti-Doping Agency.175  Sometime during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1892. 
172. Neville Cox, Victory with Honour or Victory at All Costs? Towards Principled Justifications 
for Anti-Doping Rules in Sport, 22 DUBLIN U. L.J. 19, 20 n. 5 (2000). 
173. Julian Savulescu et al., Why We Should Allow Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport, 38 
BR. J. SPORTS MED. 666 (2004). 
174. Id. 
175. William Fotheringham, Timeline: Lance Armstrong’s Journey from Deity to Disgrace, THE 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 09, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/mar/09/lance-armstrong-cycling-
doping-scandal??. 
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the early millennium, Barry Bonds, a revered baseball player, was discovered 
to have used PE drugs, which contributed to his late-career home-run surge.176  
Reports from the New York Times revealed that his ingestion of prohibited 
substances was broad in range and included insulin, the human growth  
hormone177, and trenbolone (a steroid also used to improve the muscle quality 
of beef cattle), to name a few.178  In a similar vein, Ben Johnson, a superstar 
sprinter, was stripped of his Olympic Gold medal in 1988 in the 100-meter 
dash after testing positive for anabolic steroids.179  Adding to the impugned 
roster of PE-induced athletes, Rashard Lewis, an all-star basketball forward, 
was suspended for ten games in 2009 in light of positive test results for PE 
drugs indicating elevated testosterone levels.180  At last, for using the same 
drug that was injected into the noble creature in Riesberry, namely  
Clenbuterol, in 2014 the National Hockey League suspended forward, Carter 
Ashton.181  The list undoubtedly goes on. 
One cannot help but wonder what behavioural explanation underlies the 
zero-sum risk-taking approach of the above-mentioned athletes resulting in the 
denigration of their claims to fame, and inciting doubt in the merit of their 
achievements in the hearts of their fans.  Such behavioural and ethical  
quandaries have occupied the minds of intellectuals such as Justice Richard 
Posner and Michael Sandel, both of whom provide some useful philosophical 
musings that prove enlightening in this context. 
Sandel’s view can be juxtaposed with that of Justice Posner.  Sandel  
opposes the use of drug enhancement in athletic performance, viewing it at as 
a detractor from the athlete’s achievement.182  Sandel’s philosophy suggests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176. Michiko Kakutani, Barry Bonds and Baseball’s Steroids Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/23/books/23kakubarry-bonds-and-baseballs-steroids-
scandal.html?n=Top%2FFeatures%2FBooks. 
177. Id.  The human growth hormone (HgH) “causes bone and muscle development beyond that 
which would result from the expression of the athlete’s own DNA; this drug effectively trumps that 
DNA.”  Coleman & Coleman Jr., supra note 162, at 1771. 
178. Kakutani, supra note 176. 
179. James H. Marsh, Ben Johnson, THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA: HISTORICA CANADA (Mar. 
24, 2008), http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/ben-johnson/.  See Cox, supra note 172, 
at 19. 
180. Michael S. Schmidt, Rashard Lewis Suspended by N.B.A. for Doping Violation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/sports/basketball/07nba.html. 
181. The Canadian Press, Maple Leafs Forward Carter Ashton Suspended for 20 Games for  
Violation of Drug Policy, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 6, 2014, 
https://www.thestar.com/sports/leafs/2014/11/06/maple_leafs_forward_carter_ashton_suspended_20_
games_for_violation_of_drug_policy.html. 
182. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Prometheus: Some Ethical, Economic and Regulatory  
Issues of Sports Doping, 57 DUKE L.J. 1725, 1726 (2008). 
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that athletes choose to enhance their natural capacity for selfish reasons and, in 
doing so, effectively alter the organic course of human nature.  Justice Posner 
frames the issue differently, advancing the view that sports test biological  
potential, rendering the nub of the issue clear, to wit: whether the intervention 
disrupts or obscures hierarchy, including animal hierarchies, such as those in 
horse racing.183 
On the issue of deterrence, Justice Posner argues, “[t]he combination of 
difficulty of detection with incentives to defect may make purely private  
sanctions for violating a doping ban an inadequate deterrent,” adding that 
“[c]riminal or other public penalties may be necessary.”184  Deterrence, in his 
view, boils down to a simple mathematical theorem encapsulated by the  
formula S > B/P.185  The “S” is the sanction that must exceed the value of the 
benefit “B” divided by the probability “P”, that the violation will be  
detected.186  In other words, the smaller P is, and the larger B is in relation to 
P, the less likely sanctions will deter.  As submitted in Part II by the authors, 
this explains why the use of criminal sanctions may be a more attractive  
deterring feature in response to race horse doping. 
Interestingly, some academics argue the contrary position, namely that PE 
drugs are not an imprecation on the integrity of sports.  Savulescu, Foddy, and 
Clayton support the position that “human sport is different from animal sport 
because it is creative,” citing the notion that “biological manipulation  
embodies the human spirit.”187  They succinctly summarize their position in 
stating that, 
 
Performance enhancement is not against the spirit of sport; it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183. Id. at 1729. 
184. Id. at 1736. 
185. Id.  
186. Id.  Consider a juxtaposition embedded in the work of Gary L. Francione who offers that  
 
Most moral matters do not lend themselves to the certainty that we can have about  
mathematics.  We cannot have mathematical certainty about our moral views—whatever 
they may be—concerning capital punishment, affirmative action, abortion or animal 
rights.  We may have compelling arguments that support our moral views, but we cannot 
say that those views are indisputably true and certain in the way that “two plus two equals 
four” is indisputably true and certain. 
 
GARY FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR YOUR DOG? xxxiv, 
xxxv (2000). 
187. Savulescu et al., supra note 173, at 667. 
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is the spirit of sport.  To choose to be better is to be human.  
Athletes should be given this choice.  Their welfare should be 
paramount.  But taking drugs is not necessarily cheating.  The 
legalization legalisation of drugs in sport may be fairer and 
safer.188  
 
Facially, the argument looks attractive.  It embodies the core of the human 
disposition, armed with free will and agency.  In some ways, the argument is 
libertarian in nature, evoking the principle that one can do to oneself what one 
wishes, so long as it does not bring harm to others.  The meaning of harm and 
its various gradients is, however, debatable, as it can range from the  
faith-based reliance of loyal fans whose attachment to a particular athlete can 
be shattered, to the act of providing PE drugs to athletes, which, more times 
than not, will negatively impact their health and career as well as the sport in 
question.  Although “doping is anathema for clean athletes at all levels, known 
or suspected doping that disturbs the natural hierarchy at this most elite level is 
particularly abhorrent to spectators.”189  
Perhaps, the more intriguing debate is whether human sport is different 
from animal sport because it is “creative,” thus warranting the use of PE drugs.  
The authors contend that a more accurate distinction between human and  
animal sport lies with the inability of animals to employ a decision-making 
matrix and choose to be “better” for themselves.  To that extent, the choice to 
be better is appropriated by the person employing the animal as a form of 
property in furtherance of a financial interest.  Thus, it stands to reason that we 
ought to turn our minds to the debate surrounding animal ethics to better  
understand the master-servant relationship that reflects horse racing. 
C. The Animal Ethics of it All 
Our conception of the place of animals in the order of living things ignites 
a moral debate that is not new to ethical inquiries, finding early origins in 
Western philosophical thought.  The dialogue surrounding animal ethics is  
developing dynamically around the world as issues surrounding humane 
treatment makes its way to the forefront of animal welfare. 
Paola Cavalieri encapsulates the “waves” of Western thinking on the 
treatment of animals into three critical “moments” in time: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188. Id. at 670 (emphasis added). 
189. Coleman & Coleman, Jr., supra note 162, at 1764. 
MANARIN	  AND	  ZAIA	  28.1	  FINAL.DOCX	  (DO	  NOT	  DELETE)	   1/14/18	  	  3:42	  PM	  
190 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 28:1 
The first moment saw a struggle within the Classical Greek 
world between the idea of an original bond among all  
conscious beings and a contrasting global plan of  
rationalization of human and nonhuman exploitation.  The  
latter prevailed and the situation remained unaltered for the 
many centuries of Christianized Europe.  Then, the scientific 
revolution of the seventeenth century generated a novel round 
of controversy by setting a new agenda for animals, one which 
required the removal of the only constraint left on their  
treatment – the prohibition of cruelty … In the last few  
decades, a third critical moment has arrived with a new turn of 
the screw in animal exploitation.  The rapid process of  
industrialization and mechanization of farming practises has 
altered the traditional landscape, and has generated a new 
wave of debate, characterized by the fact that reactions have 
preceded attempts at rationalization, and that different voices 
have been raised against a new kind of exploitation.190 
 
Some of the earliest debates on how animals ought to be used and treated 
find themselves in the voice of Pythagoras (580 BC), who once declared that it 
is “wicked as human bloodshed to draw the knife across the throat of the 
calf.”191  Followers of Pythagoras believed in a kinship between humans and 
other species, rooted in the idea that we are made from the same elements, 
permeated by the same breath, and animated by the same reincarnated souls.192  
Ultimately, the Pythagoreans rejected the killing of animals for food or  
religious sacrifice.193 
In time, a more modern, Western ideology preoccupied the views of Greek 
thinker Theophrastus who noted that people who are born from the same  
ancestors are naturally kin, and that kinship is widely expanding, dovetailing 
with the view that animals are kin to humans because they have the same  
bodily organs, tissues, fluids, appetites, emotions, perceptions, and reason.194  
Debates ruminating on questions concerning animal perception, emotions, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190. PAOLA CAVALIERI, THE ANIMAL DEBATE: A REEXAMINATION, K IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS: 
THE SECOND WAVE 54–55 (Peter Singer ed., 2006). 
191. DAVID FRASER, UNDERSTANDING ANIMAL WELFARE: THE SCIENCE IN ITS CULTURAL 
CONTEXT 10 (2008). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 12. 
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and the ability to reason dominated philosophical thinking in the decades that 
followed.  Closer scrutiny of evolutionary philosophical thinking around the 
world reveals a gradual progression in thought from a stark divide between  
rational and irrational beings, to a paradigm shift proffering sameness.   
Consider the following selections on the evolution, and sometimes regression, 
of critical thought pertaining to animal welfare, as observed by David Fraser: 
 
Aristotle (384 BC– 323 BC) . . . concluded that although  
humans and animals share many characteristics such as  
perception and emotion, humans alone have the capacity for 
logos or reason . . .  However, thinkers of the Stoic school—a 
rival to the Pythagoreans—made it the basis for their ethical 
position on animals.  The Stoics saw justice as rooted in the 
concept of mutual belonging.  According to the Stoics, no 
such community of belonging can exist between rational and 
non-rational beings.  Hence, what had been for Aristotle a 
purely factual conclusion about the mental powers of animals 
was used by the Stoics as the basis for the ethical conclusion 
that animals fall outside the sphere of human justice and  
moral concern;195  
 
Epicurus (341 BC–271 BC) viewed justice as a contract or 
agreement between different people to avoid causing harm to 
each other.  Justice, because it requires a measure of  
agreement about what constitutes acceptable behavior, could 
not be applied to animals because animals lack the powers of 
reason needed to enter into such a contract;196  
 
Plutarch (46 AD–119 AD) repudiated the work of Aristotle.  
Using anecdotal stories to establish that animals could use 
reason, he noted, for example, that in Thrace, people use a fox 
to test whether it is safe to venture onto ice.  The fox walks 
warily on the ice and listens carefully.  If it hears running  
water, it deduces that the ice is not thick and returns to shore, 
but if there is no sound, then it proceeds ahead;197 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195. Id. 
196. Id.  
197. Id. at 12–13. 
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By the seventeenth century in France, philosophical musings 
on this topic regressed significantly.  For example, Descartes’ 
endeavour, however, was favoured by his ability to draw upon 
two different theoretical sources − classical metaphysics, with 
its rational, immortal souls for humans, and the new  
mechanistic view of nature as mere matter for animals.  The 
resulting doctrine allowed investigators to perform vivisection 
in an even more ruthless manner;198 
 
Kant, in his Lecture on Ethics, framed the debate in a similar 
vein.  His focus primarily hinged on the furtherance of  
humankind through animals as vessels for our duties to each 
other: “[b]ut so far as animals are concerned, we have no  
direct duties.  Animals are not self-conscious and are merely 
as a means to an end.  That end is man.  We can ask, ‘Why do 
animals exist?  But to ask, ‘Why does man exist?’ is a  
meaningless question.  Our duties towards animals are merely 
indirect duties towards humanity;”199 
 
By the time the debate made its way to England during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, cruelty to animals was 
commonplace.  At the cusp of the Enlightenment, thinkers like 
Bentham advanced the idea that good acts are those  
engendering the greatest amount of good, applicable to both 
humans and animals that can experience happiness and  
suffering.  As he so aptly put it, the question is not whether 
animals can reason, but rather, whether they can suffer;200 
 
In England, John Lawrence advocated for the rights of beasts 
in Philosophical and Practical Treatise on Horses and  
argued: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198. CAVALIERI, supra note 190, at 59 (defining “Vivisection” as the study of physiological  
processes by literally cutting living animals). 
199. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 239 (Louis Infield trans., Harper & Row Publishers 
1963).   
200. FRASER, supra note 191, at 18–19. 
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No human government, I believe has ever recognized the 
jus animalium, which surely ought to form a part of the 
jurisprudence on every system, founded on the principles 
of justice and humanity . . . . I therefore propose, that the 
Rights of Beasts be formally acknowledged by the state, 
and that a law be framed upon that principle, to guard and 
protect them from acts of flagrant and wanton cruelty, 
whether committed by their owners or others.201 
 
In 1821, a wealthy land-owner from Ireland, Richard Martin, 
introduced his Ill-Treatment of Horses Bill.  The bill was  
defeated on its first attempt, but succeeded on the second 
when re-introduced and drafted to include cattle and horses.  
Not surprisingly, it was met with laughter by some Members 
of Parliament when the proposal was announced;202  
 
A spokesman for German continental philosophy in the years 
following the end of World War II, Martin Heidegger  
defended “primal ethics” that is “based on a non-invasive  
policy of allowing living and non-living things to be what 
they are”.203  Writing much to the chagrin of other thinkers, he 
stated “[o]nly man dies.  The animal perishes . . .  referring to 
a qualitative alterity of nonhumans”;204 
 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, “Henry Salt asked: 
‘Have the lower animals “rights”?  In answering his own 
question, he responded: “undoubtedly − if men have.”  Peter 
Singer later accepted this proposition in the Twentieth  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201. JOHN LAWRENCE, TREATISE ON HORSES, AND ON THE MORAL DUTIES OF MAN 123 (2d ed. 
1802). 
202. FRASER, supra note 191, at 21. 
203. CAVALIERI, supra note 190, at 61. 
204. Id. at 61–62.  Eventually, the narrative of Heidegger was countered by post-modern thinkers 
such as Jacques Derrida, who presented himself as a scholar of Heidegger.  Derrida diverged from 
Heidegger’s discourse on animality, imputing to Western philosophy a sacrificial structure that  
countenances ways to negate the other and the noncriminal putting to death of animals.   
Notwithstanding his dissonance, Derrida pointed directly to the human subject as central, and going 
so far as to declare vegetarianism not as the sparing of animals, but as a shorthand to good  
conscience.  Id. at 62–63. 
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Century.  Citing Regan, Singer interprets Regan’s work to 
mean that “animals are individuals with beliefs, desires,  
perception, memory, a sense of the future, an emotional life, 
preferences, the ability to initiate action in pursuit of goals, 
psychophysical identity over time, and an individual welfare 
in the sense that things can go well or badly for them.”205  He 
added that “[s]entient creatures are not receptacles for  
valuable experiences”, citing a problem with dialogue about 
the inherent value of a sentient being existing only in a human 
being;206  
 
While not nearly representative of the entire history of animal welfare, the 
above-discussed timeline unveils an important shift in human thought as it  
relates to the place of animals in the ordinal ranking of life forms.  More  
importantly, it evinces an oscillating process of thinking that has prevailed 
since early Greek thought, a dialectic that swings between a pro-animal  
ideologue and its converse.  The dialogue appears to be fixated on fluctuating 
variables: animals as they are in respect of, and in relation to, souls, morality, 
reason, and society as a social fabric.  It appears that the positions proffered by 
animal ethicists are often influenced by the time period in which they write, 
the thinkers preceding them, and the frame of reference from which they  
considered animal welfare, be it mere consciousness, sentience, or  
otherwise.207  
A common consideration for animal theorists is whether animals are  
sentient in nature, possessing a consciousness, and subjective experience of 
pain and suffering.208  To be sentient, “means to be the sort of being who has 
subjective experiences of pain (and pleasure) and to have interests in not  
experiencing that pain (or in experiencing pleasure)” and thus notably “most 
of the animals that we use for food, experiments, entertainment, and clothing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation or Animal Rights?, 70 THE MONIST 3, 6 (1987). 
206. Id. at 8.  A similar point is echoed in Nelson Potter, Kant on Duties to Animals, 13 
JAHRBUCH FÜR RECHT UND ETHIK 299, 306 (2005) wherein he states, “[t]he fact that animals are in 
no position to complain of bad treatment to a court is no more a reason for thinking they cannot have 
their rights against such treatment than it is reason for thinking an abused patient suffering from senile 
dementia could have no such rights.”  
207. FRASER, supra note 191, at 16–17 (For example, in and around the Glorious Revolution, 
 brutality towards animals and humans was sufficiently commonplace in Britain to provoke surprised 
comment by visitors from continental Europe.). 
208. FRANCIONE, supra note 186, at xxiii. 
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unquestionably have such subjective experiences.”209  Gary L. Francione 
maintains: 
 
To deny that animals are conscious of pain, or to assert that 
we cannot know whether animals feel pain, is as absurd as to 
deny that other humans are conscious of pain or to assert that 
we cannot know whether other humans feel pain.  The  
neurological and physiological similarities between humans 
and nonhumans renders the fact of animal sentience  
non-controversial.  Even mainstream science accepts that  
animals are sentient.  For example, the U.S. Public Health 
Services states that “[u]nless the contrary is established,  
investigators should consider that procedures that cause pain 
or distress in human beings may cause pain or distress in other 
animals.”  And scientists use animals in pain experiments, 
which would, of course, be useless if animals did not  
experience pain, and in a way that is substantially similar to 
the way we feel pain.210 
 
Francione also rejects the understanding of animals as the property of  
human beings.  He argues that we are obligated to extend to animals only one 
right—the right not to be treated as the property of humans.211  The reader will 
recall that the etymology of the word “cheat” is linked to fraudulently  
obtaining property.  Property, as it pertains to horse racing, indubitably lies in 
the money that is lost or gained following a race.212  The means facilitating the 
accrual of such profit lies in the use of the horse.  Gains are contingent on the 
performance of the horse.  That the horse is the property of a racing  
stakeholder is a presumptively troubling starting point, one which Francione 
seeks to deconstruct and debunk, particularly if we believe that animals are 
sentient creatures.  
Comparatively, Francione’s desire to jettison our understanding of animals 
as property is the most progressive of its kind in the face of other  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209. Id. at xxxvii.  
210. Id. at xxxvi–xxxvii. 
211. Id. at xxxi. 
212. Gasparon, supra note 97, at 201 (noting that “many owners and trainers view their racehorses 
as investments and will do anything to get ahead in the sport, including administering performance-
enhancing drugs to their horses to gain a competitive advantage.”  This view serves as support for the 
notion that the horse itself is used simply as a means to generate profit.). 
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contemporary thinkers.  For example, as Francione interprets the comments of 
Peter Singer in Animal Liberation endorses the view that while we ought to 
apply the principle of equal consideration to the interests of all sentient  
animals, we should not abolish the property status of animals insofar as we can 
still use animals for human purposes.213  Similarly, Francione adds that in The 
Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan believes that “we ought to abolish and not 
merely regulate animal exploitation.”214  The fundamental wrong, in Regan’s 
view, is that “the system allows us to view animals as our resources, here for 
us—to be eaten, or surgically manipulated, or exploited for sport or money.”215  
Notwithstanding this view, Regan does not extend the idea that animals have 
moral rights to all sentient creatures, but only those being “subjects of a 
life”216 with a set of “beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of 
the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings 
of pleasure and pain.”217  
It would appear that Francione’s theory fits most agreeably with sentience.  
If animals are not the property of human beings and bear the ability to  
experience pain, then believing that animals are sentient is not so far-fetched.   
The concept of animal sentience does not only occupy the academic 
whims of philosophical thinking.  Indeed, the concern for animal sentience is 
much more vast.  Recently, the concept of sentience made its way into  
legislative enactment in the province of Quebec.  In 2015, the National  
Assembly enacted Bill C-54, an act to improve the legal situation of animals.  
The purpose of the Act is to establish rules for the protection of domestic and 
wild animals, mandating that an owner or custodian ensure that an animal  
receive care that is consistent with its biological needs.218  The Act cites the 
condition of animals as a social concern, hinting at the rise in public interest 
for animal welfare.  Particularly commendable in the general provisions of the 
Bill is section 898.1 which reads that: 
 
Animals are not things.  They are sentient beings and have  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213. FRANCIONE, supra note 186, at xxxii. 
214. Id. 
215. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 13 (Peter Singer ed., 
1985). 
216. Id. at 6. (describing that each of us, as humans, are the experiencing “subject of a life,” a 
“conscious creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to 
others.”). 
217. FRANCIONE, supra note 186, at xxxii. 
218. See Bill 54, An Act to Improve the Legal Situation of Animals, 1st Sess, 41st Leg, Quebec, 
2015 (assented to Dec. 4, 2015), explanatory notes [hereinafter The Act].  
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biological needs.  In addition to the provisions of special Acts 
which protect animals, the provisions of this Code and any 
other Act concerning property nonetheless apply to animals.219  
 
The Act also provisions for the appointment of specific persons, including, 
but not limited to, inspectors and veterinarians, with powers to enter dwelling 
houses, vehicles, or other enclosed places if there is a reasonable cause to  
believe that an animal is in distress, or their welfare or safety is  
compromised.220  Sanctions are also prescribed for the contravention of the 
Act, which include fines of up to $12,500.00, and terms of imprisonment of up 
to eighteen months subject to the discretion of a sentencing judge.221  The 
composition of the Act evinces the Legislature’s intent to impose a concise, 
centralized regulatory regime as an alternative to existing regimes with a 
catchall spirit that captures a range of treatment in respect of animals.   
Whether the penalties prescribed, in accompaniment with the powers  
enumerated for inspectors tasked to protect the integrity of the animals, will 
serve to be sufficiently deterrent, only time will tell. 
While the concern for animal welfare and the existence of animal  
sentience is not universal, it is posited that the human race should generally 
agree that the cruel treatment of animals ought not be tolerated.   
Problematically, as is obvious in the Riesberry case, some may simply view 
horse racing as a form of entertainment, a form of play that is predicated on 
capital gain more than on the welfare of the noble creature used in the  
competition.  Nevertheless, society’s understanding of animal welfare  
crystallizes distinctly when cruelty issues come to the fore. As explained by 
Andrew Cohen: 
 
[n]o one beyond the world of horse racing cares if industry  
insiders cheat each other.  But plenty of people beyond the 
world of horse racing cares if the animals at the heart of the 
sport are treated cruelly.  Horse racing simply cannot survive 
if the general public believes racehorses are abused or  
neglected.222  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219. See The Act, at Part I, § 898.1; see also § 898.1, cl. 17 (stating that “no person may be the 
owner or custodian of 15 or more equines without holding a permit issued for that purpose by the 
Minister”) (emphasis added). 
220. The Act, at § 898.1, cl. 35–41. 
221. The Act, at § 898.1, cl. 65–67. 
222. Andrew Cohen, The Ugly Truth About Horse Racing, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 24, 2014, 
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Cohen’s statement strikes an important chord.  If we accept that animals 
do suffer and indeed possess some interest in averting suffering, then surely 
those outside of the horse racing realm do not countenance the cruel treatment 
of horses.  Arguably, the injection of PE drugs, some of which may have  
adverse effects on a horse,223 constitutes a form of animal battery.  Thus, the 
combination of the fraudulent manipulation of the race, with the  
non-consensual abuse of the “athlete,” must command a heavy sanction. 
If we choose to operate on the presupposition that animals are sentient  
beings, there is no question that the injection of a PE drug is a misguided and 
abusive procedure.  Until a universal agreement on the treatment of animals is 
reached, and we begin to conceptualize animals as sentient beings that are not 
merely the property of humans, the use of PE drugs in horse racing will likely 
remain commonplace.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
The reader will have undoubtedly surmised by this point that the fate of 
Derek Riesberry not only provides Canadian jurisprudence with a chapter of 
added meaning for fraud as it pertains to organized sports, but it also incites 
broad-stroke ethical questions about the place of animals in the ordinal ranking 
of species.  The lessons learned from the Riesberry case are underpinned by a 
cross-spectrum of legal areas including administrative law, jurisprudence, and 
legal ethics to name a few.  Importantly, the Supreme Court of Canada’s  
holding serves as an example of how test litigation on antiquated provisions in 
the Code is interpreted by modern courts, and whether interpretations are more 
likely to be subject to legal error where minimal jurisprudence exists. 
When all was said and done, Mr. Riesberry received a total fine in the 
amount of $3,750.00 for the charges of fraud and attempted fraud over 
$5,000.00, with one year to pay.224  The trial court, despite placing much 
greater emphasis on general deterrence than rehabilitation or specific  
deterrence, was heavily swayed by Mr. Riesberry’s positive pre-sentence  
report, which described him as a man who has no substance abuse problems, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/03/the-ugly-truth-about-horse-racing/284594/ 
(emphasis added). 
223. For example, Bute (a.k.a. “Clenbuterol”) is an anti-inflammatory drug that does not affect a 
horse’s performance beyond relieving its pain.  It is extremely common, but long-term usage may 
result in ulcers, which can result in a loss of weight, appetite, and gastrointestinal bleeding.  An  
overdose can lead to kidney failure and death.  Gasparon, supra note 97, at 207. 
224. Riesberry, [2013] O.J. No. 6504 at para. 4–5. 
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maintains a positive relationship with his children, is gainfully employed, and 
has no intention of applying for a licence   to train or own horses.225  While 
Mr. Riesberry entered the criminal justice system clean of a criminal record, 
he is now branded with the “scarlet letter” of a cheat and carries a criminal 
conviction.226  In many ways, Mr. Riesberry is the test case himself,  
representing the otherwise upstanding citizen that one least expects would 
someday meet the criminal courts. 
Whether the stigma of a criminal record will serve to deter future racing 
licensees from violating certain of the governing Rules remains to be seen.  
Such questions surrounding deterrence are contingent on whether the  
Attorneys General sees fit to prosecute such matters.  In Canada, the integrity 
of sporting endeavors, let alone those that involve animals, has not made its 
way to the top of crime-control agendas for past and present federal  
governments.  Until the legal landscape changes, we can only hope that  
questions surrounding animal welfare remain topical and relevant for those 
who bet and those who drive the bet.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225. Id. at 3, lines 15–26. 
226. Brian Cross, Horse-Doping Trainer ‘Branded with The Scarlet Letter of a Cheat’, Prosecutor 
Says, WINDSOR STAR, Apr. 11, 2016, http://windsorstar.com/news/local-news/horse-doping-trainer-
branded-with-the-scarlet-letter-of-a-cheat-prosecutor-says. 
